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Abstract 
The Trappist monk Thomas Merton is best remembered for his spiritual autobiography 
The Seven Storey Mountain and many other books on prayer and contemplation. His later 
writings, however, reveal a deep concern about the relationship between God and human 
freedom.  Merton was particularly worried that obedience to God, traditionally understood as a 
central virtue, not constitute a form of authoritarianism that stripped humanity of the capacity for 
authenticity.  Hence, he used the figure of Prometheus, long a symbol of rebellion against God, 
to challenge authoritarian theism and iconoclastic anti-theistic humanism.  In the process, he 
deconstructed his own God-image away from a heteronomous authority towards something akin 
to the non-sovereign and “weak” theology of the contemporary religious turn in Continental 
philosophy.  
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Introduction 
 
 The Trappist monk Thomas Merton (1915-1968) was one of the most popular Catholic 
writers of the 20
th
 century.  His Seven Storey Mountain touched a chord in readers able to 
identify with his restlessness, his doubt, and his longing for authenticity in a troubled world, ever 
at war.  At the heart of Merton’s mature writings, however, was not the original contemptus 
mundi that characterized his early conversion to Catholicism, the culmination of his bestseller.  
Rather, it was a sustained pursuit of authenticity, driven by a more expansive view that included 
a critique of the Catholic Church.  Merton’s recognition of the potential in other religious 
traditions and the insights in the various dimensions of human culture allowed him to bring a 
broader perspective to bear on the conflict between orthodox Christian theism and anti-theist 
humanism.  On his view, truth was not to be found in either a divine power that stripped human 
beings of their integrity as free beings, or in a humanity that co-opted the powers of God, but 
rather in a “holy rebellion” that exposed and overturned the desire for domination in both 
positions.  Merton pursued this “holy rebellion” by focusing on the way in which Christian 
theists and their anti-theist opponents respectively represented Hesiod’s and Aeschylus’ 
interpretations of the mythic figure of Prometheus.  By setting out these opposing positions on 
God as different responses to the Prometheus myth, Merton championed a rejection of classical 
theism, an “a-theism” that might today be called a “weak” or “radical theology.” 
It is widely accepted in Merton scholarship that the center of Merton’s theological 
“system,” s’il y en a, is his theological anthropology, in particular as articulated in the language 
of the “true self” and the “false self.” Those concepts have been explored in too many books and 
articles to count, but the two that most clearly articulate them are James Finley’s 
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classic Merton’s Palace of Nowhere and Anne Carr’s A Search for Wisdom and Spirit.
1
 
Explorations of Merton’s emphasis on kenosis as the centerpiece of the character of God, and 
more particularly in his Christology, are also not new. George Kilcourse’s Ace of Freedoms uses 
the title image from Merton’s late book of poetry Cables to the Ace to represent the kenotic 
Christ: like the ace in a deck of cards, which can play as the highest or the lowest card in a suit, 
Kilcourse sees Merton’s Christ defined by kenosis, “going high” (being exalted as Christ) 
because he “goes low” (refusing the ego-gratifications of the false self). Chris Pramuk’s brilliant 
book Sophia: The Hidden Christ of Thomas Merton meditatively explores Merton’s relationship 
with the sophiological tradition in Russian Orthodoxy, among other literary and theological 
influences, to trace the underlying metaphors that guided Merton’s Christology.
2
 
Less has been written about Merton’s concept of God, perhaps because more or less 
orthodox Christian writers might reasonably presume that someone who had spent decades as a 
Catholic monk might accept the standard Christian God-image without too much compromise. I 
suspect that it is also more acceptable for most theological audiences to tinker with conceptions 
of the human person than with conceptions of God. Despite Merton’s significant writings on the 
“death of God” theology of the 1960s, there is little in the Merton scholarship that suggests that 
he had much theological kinship with them beyond a rather pedestrian liberal critique of 
tendencies to self-importance in institutional Christianity. Numerous commentators in the 
secondary literature on Merton have noted his lengthy correspondence with the Protestant 
theologian Paul Tillich, but few have explored Tillich’s influence on Merton’s existential 
                                                 
1
 See James Finley, Merton’s Palace of Nowhere: A Search for God Through Awareness of the True Self. Notre 
Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1978 and Anne Carr, A Search for Wisdom and Spirit: Thomas Merton’s Theology of the 
Self. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 
2
 See George Kilcourse, Ace of Freedoms: Thomas Merton’s Christ. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1993 
and Chris Pramuk, Sophia: The Hidden Christ of Thomas Merton. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2009. 
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instincts or the potential kinship of Tillich’s radical theology to Merton’s sapiential/sophianic 
view of God as a weak force in the world. Frederick Parrella highlights the importance for 
Merton of the confrontation with the abyss as well as his nascent use of Tillich in exploring Zen 
through his encounters with D.T. Suzuki.
3
 
The few commentators that hint that Merton might have been moving away from his 
Christian commitments generally argue that he was on the verge of becoming a Buddhist,
4
 but 
the discussion of Merton as a postmodern figure, and more specifically as one making a move 
toward a kind of radical theology, remains a contentious and underexplored area of Merton 
studies. In his exploration of Merton’s development into a “radical humanist,”
5
 David Cooper 
explores Merton’s sympathy towards the death of God theologians but argues that Merton 
maintained a respectful distance from their conclusions. Robert Inchausti has said more about 
Merton’s connection to postmodernity than most Merton scholars; in Thomas Merton’s 
American Prophecy, he argues forcefully against what he sees as a mistaken temptation “to draw 
analogies between Merton’s call for a postontological monasticism and the radical critique of 
classical metaphysics offered by postmodern and poststructuralist theorists” (Inchausti, American 
Prophecy 131). I hope in this paper to explore what seems to me an underappreciated thread of 
Merton’s thought, not merely away from God as a (heteronomous) being to God as “ground of 
being,” which still inserts God at the base of the metaphysical system, but as the ground of the 
person, the deepest reality of the self in confrontation with the abyss of meaninglessness and 
                                                 
3
 See Frederick Parrella, Paul Tillich’s Theological Legacy: Spirit and Community. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 
1995.  
4
Merton’s college friend Ed Rice pushes most strongly that Merton may well have been on his way out of the 
monastery and into Buddhism in his now classic biography The Man in the Sycamore Tree: The Good Times and 
Hard Life of Thomas Merton. Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1972. 
5
 See David Cooper, Thomas Merton’s Art of Denial: The Evolution of a Radical Humanist. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1989. 
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despair. At a social level, Merton’s God shifts from the guarantor of moral absolutes to the 
lonely voice of dissent from the herd, the one who, though present in all people, is hidden like a 
“shy wild deer” beneath the falsities of the mass mind, the herd mentality that comes from the 
need for ratification of the exterior self. 
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Chapter 1: Thomas Merton and Prometheus: The Problem of God in Postmodernity 
 
 While numerous ancient sources mention the Prometheus myth, Merton focused on two, 
contrasting their portrayals of Prometheus and Zeus: Hesiod’s version from his Theogony and his 
Works and Days, and Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the first (and only remaining extant) story 
in what was originally a trilogy which included Prometheus Unbound and Prometheus the Fire-
Bringer. Writing in the 9
th
 century BCE, Hesiod presented Prometheus as the villain, a minor 
trickster who, even before his theft of fire, enraged Zeus with the “trick at Mecone”: Prometheus 
gave Zeus a choice between the desirable meat and fat of an ox (which were hidden in its 
unappealing stomach) and the bones and organs (which were hidden under a layer of fat so as to 
appear appetizing). Zeus recognized the deception but chose the inferior portion so as to have a 
reason to punish Prometheus, which he did by chaining him to Caucasus and driving a stake 
through his heart. Additionally, Zeus punished humankind by sending Pandora (“all gifts”), 
despite Prometheus’ warning to his brother Epimetheus: “never accept any gift from the gods” 
(Merton, Raids 81). 
The fifth-century dramatist Aeschylus, in his Prometheus Bound, drew on but 
significantly altered Hesiod’s depiction of the Prometheus myth. Whereas for Hesiod 
Prometheus’ theft of fire followed his attempt to deceive Zeus, for Aeschylus Zeus’ punishment 
followed the Titanomachy, the war between the Olympians and the Titans; Prometheus sided 
with the Olympians against his fellow Titans and proved instrumental in Zeus’ victory, thus 
making Zeus’ betrayal all the more unjust. Aeschylus suggested as well that Prometheus was 
being punished for foiling Zeus’ plan to destroy the human race as well as for stealing fire, and 
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that Prometheus not only gave fire to the humans but taught them the whole range of human arts: 
metallurgy, animal husbandry, architecture, and more. 
John Bellamy Foster notes that Prometheus “was the predominant cultural hero of the 
entire Romantic period, and…stands in Western culture not only for technology but even more 
for creativity, revolution, and rebellion against the gods (against religion). Rubens, Titian, Dante, 
Milton, Blake, Goethe, Beethoven, Byron, Shelley, and numerous others incorporated 
Prometheus as a central motif in their work” (Foster 230). Standard theistic arguments present 
Prometheus as a thief and a rebel, a symbol of hubris and the folly of humanism cut off from 
God; the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, with whom Merton maintained a 
correspondence for years, saw Prometheus as “the symbol of man's attempt to raise himself by 
his own bootstraps to the level of the gods. The human ‘I’ exalts itself in self-affirmation, seizing 
fire from heaven - not only emancipating itself from inherited constraints, whether biological or 
historical, but aiming at the total mastery of existence” (Nichols xi). Conversely, atheistic 
arguments typically position Aeschylus’ Prometheus against the unjust order of the gods who are 
opposed to the well-being of humanity. As but one example, Marx concluded the foreword of his 
doctoral dissertation praising Aeschylus’ Firebringer as a symbol of rejection of religious 
impositions on the philosophical and rational autonomy of humanity: 
The proclamation of Prometheus – ‘in a word, I detest all the gods’ is 
[philosophy’s] own profession, her own slogan against all the gods of heaven and 
earth who do not recognize man’s self-consciousness as the highest divinity. 
There shall be none other beside it…[Prometheus says to Hermes:] ‘Understand 
this well, I would not change my evil plight for your servility.’ Prometheus is the 
foremost saint and martyr in the philosopher’s calendar (McClellan 17). 
 
In his magisterial work The Drama of Atheist Humanism, French theologian Henri 
DeLubac notes that “The negation that underlies positivist humanism, Marxist humanism and 
Nietzschean humanism is not so much atheism, in the strict sense of the word, as antitheism, or, 
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more precisely, anti-Christianism” (DeLubac 11). Why anti-theism? Because this version of 
humanism saw God withholding human freedom, acting as an obstacle to the fulfillment of the 
human condition, demanding an obedience that denies the rational faculties of humanity. 
“Prometheus becomes a central symbol in western culture of the humanist rejection of an 
inhuman, distant, and oppressive God. If God is like Zeus, will not everyone want to imitate 
Prometheus?” (Gallagher 52); that is, if human freedom could only come at the cost of rebellion 
against God, impiety would be the pious option. 
It is perhaps no accident that Merton’s first writings on Prometheus appeared in 1958, at 
almost exactly the same time as his famous and much-analyzed “Fourth and Walnut” experience 
in which he came to reimagine the relationship of God to the world, marking a major departure 
from the dualistic worldview that had characterized his monastic life to that point. “In Louisville, 
at the corner of Fourth and Walnut, in the center of the shopping district, I was suddenly 
overwhelmed with the realization that I loved all those people…it was as if I suddenly saw the 
secret beauty of their hearts, the depths of their hearts where neither sin nor desire nor self-
knowledge can reach, the core of their reality, the person that each one is in God’s eyes” 
(Conjectures 156-7). In light of this insight into the hidden reality of all persons, Merton began 
to see his own vocation anew, not in terms of superiority over those who had not learned to 
escape the world, but in a recognition of his own solidarity with the world and a renewed focus 
on how he as a monk might offer the world the benefits of his own monastic solitude. He 
recalled the experience as one of seeing through the paradoxical illusion of his own monastic life 
as free from illusion: “It was like waking from a dream of separateness, of spurious self-isolation 
in a special world, the world of renunciation and supposed holiness” (Conjectures 156). This 
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experience dramatically reshaped Merton’s understanding of his monastic life and, I suggest, 
religion in general. 
Merton’s writings on Prometheus emerged from a desire to short-circuit the 
condemnatory “over-againstness” of God which he had come to critique in the wake of his 
experience in Louisville. “Prometheus: A Meditation,” his first essay on the Titan, centered on 
the image of alienated humanity attempting to steal the fire of selfhood, spiritual freedom, and 
maturity from the “small gods,” those forces that keep humanity submissive, guilty, and obedient 
to authority. Merton continued his reflections on Hesiod’s Promethean mysticism in 
“Promethean Theology,” a chapter in his book The New Man, which was published in 1961 but 
written, like his “Meditation,” in 1958, expanding on the same broad themes that emerged in that 
essay. Pointing to the psychological situation of modern humanity, “guilty, rebellious, frustrated, 
unsure of himself, of his gifts and of his own strength, alienated, yet seeking to assert himself” 
(Merton, New Man 23), Merton reflected on the economy of Christian salvation, in particular the 
presupposition that human alienation signified condemnation by God. At the heart of this false 
mysticism was a distorted God-image, that of God as Zeus, the jealous father who is “more or 
less resentful of man’s natural powers, and above all of his freedom,” leaving humanity with the 
choice of rebellion or submission: “man must either save his soul by a Promethean tour de force, 
without God’s help, or else that man must turn his freedom inside out, stew up all his natural 
gifts into a beautiful guilt-complex, and crawl towards God on his stomach to offer Him the 
results in propitiation” (New Man 41). In the former case, which Merton linked with 
Pelagianism, God leaves humanity to work out their own salvation in history in a kind of 
“natural mysticism” of psychological adjustment, technological advancement, and utopian 
fantasies of the ultimate perfection of humanity. In the latter case, that of blind submission to 
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God, “it seems as if man saves himself and arrives at divine union by bartering his freedom for 
God’s grace” (New Man 38). At its extreme, Merton noted, human freedom is so mangled that 
“God simply makes an arbitrary decision to grant grace to this one and that one. The grace works 
infallibly…They are bound hand and foot and thrown into the wedding banquet, no doubt to be 
fed through a tube” (New Man 39). Even the benevolent symbol of the wedding feast becomes 
tyrannical when it comes at the expense of human freedom, signifying the underlying concern, 
not that God is somehow a monster who happens to be all-powerful, but that the monologue of 
divine sovereignty, no matter how benevolent in its message, is still malevolent in its medium. 
Discussing Jacques Derrida’s late writings on sovereignty and democracy, Jack Caputo notes, 
“‘The abuse of power is constitutive of the idea of sovereignty’. It is built right into it. For the 
sovereign asserts the right to act on his own, unilaterally, regardless of the will of the majority” 
(Caputo, “Without Sovereignty” 14). This view of sovereignty as formally oriented toward abuse 
of power correlates with what Merton’s longtime friend and correspondent Erich Fromm called 
“authoritarian ethics” and which “denies man’s capacity to know what is good or bad…Such a 
system is based not on reason and knowledge but on awe of the authority and on the subject’s 
feeling of weakness and dependence” (Fromm 20). 
“Theology becomes Promethean,” Merton argued, “whenever it assumes that man’s 
supreme perfection is something God wants to prevent him from attaining” (New Man 33). 
Borrowing from psychoanalytic theory, which he read extensively in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Merton discussed the psychological bind which the heteronomous God-image places on the 
believer: “The father fights his son in order that the son may not grow up and condemn the 
father. The mother shall be jealous of the daughter and shall spite her, for fear of being in her 
own turn, rejected” (New Man 26). This obvious allusion to Oedipus and Elektra suggests that 
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Promethean models of God-as-Zeus must keep humanity small, must keep the fire away from 
humans who, possessing it, would threaten His absolute sovereignty. This is not simply a 
rejection of heterodox theologies of divine tyranny; to be in conflict with the omniscient God of 
classical theism, no matter how benevolent, is de facto to be in error. Thus Merton feared that 
God-talk functions to keep people from growing in maturity, since thinking for oneself means 
thinking against the all-powerful and all-knowing God. “So from the very beginning their lives 
are a constant apology: ‘I am sorry, father, mother, but in growing up I must steal your fire. You 
are weak gods, and I love you, but you are right to fear me as I know you do. For you must 
decrease and I must increase, and I must grow and live on your decline’” (New Man 25). Merton 
noted that this tragic heroism only makes sense in light of an image of God as small and fearful, 
threatened by the maturation of His children whom he wants to remain children, dependent, 
submissive, and obliged to God in all things. 
In “Promethean Theology” Merton introduced the antithesis to the Promethean mystic, 
which he calls the “right-thinking” man, “the religious man who lives, in practice, without a 
god…who pretends to believe, who acts as if he believes, who seems to be moral because he has 
a set of rigid principles…He will rob you and enslave you and murder you and give you a 
plausible reason for doing so” (New Man 31). Although Merton identified the right-thinking as 
religious, at least externally, the emphasis on autonomous reason and the legitimation of violence 
suggests that Merton already intuited the fundamental similarity between the alienation of the 
person who sees God as a tyrant and that of those who are alienated by their own autonomy. 
Where the Promethean lives without false gods for the sake of wanting better gods, that is, for 
refusing to worship the status quo, or brute power, or the divine sadist of much popular theology, 
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the “right thinking” man treats God like a social convention, a piece of political capital to be 
used shrewdly but without any impact on the self. 
Compared to the right thinking, who protect themselves from their own alienation and 
from the challenge of a God who unseats their autonomous reason with layers of certitudes, 
theological formulas, and self-justifications, Merton took a positive view of the struggles of 
Prometheus insofar as the Titan does stand for something, even if his struggle is both futile and 
unnecessary. “In relation to the rest of men, he is indeed a giant. For he who has the courage to 
scale a mountain, even though the scaling be utterly useless, has at least a certain advantage over 
those who remain in the plain” (New Man 28). Ironically, “scaling a mountain” is not simply an 
image of overcoming the obstacle of divine tyranny, but the futile and unnecessary punishment 
on Caucasus that follows. Prometheus “marches off to Caucasus of his own accord, and chains 
himself to the rock, and calls for his pain and his vulture. Nor is it the vulture that is inexorable, 
but Prometheus, who insists that the bird be there…he, who wants to be his own god, realizes 
that he can only be so by being punished” (New Man 29). For Merton the guilt and punishment 
of rebelling against this God is entirely self-imposed, since the “living God” whom Merton 
presented is the antithesis of Zeus and not only desires human freedom but gives away 
everything in the Incarnation for its sake. Hence, Merton noted, the Promethean mysticism that 
does battle against one’s small gods requires “both heroism and despair” (New Man 29): heroism 
for the risky willingness to forge ahead without the comfort of gods, despair for the realization 
that destroying one’s gods leaves only the impossible option of becoming a god oneself. 
Even at this fairly early point in his theological maturation, Merton already understood 
the danger of seeing the relationship between God and humanity as predicated on conflict, 
particularly given the near-inevitability of humanity being on the “losing” side: guilty of 
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disobedience, under the threat of condemnation, unable to conjure its own forgiveness. This 
“atmosphere of theological litigation,” which makes it seem “as if God did not want us to be 
free, as if freedom were something He envied and begrudged us” (New Man 38), points to a 
question at the heart of Merton’s critical use of Prometheus: does God negate human freedom? 
In particular, despite Jack Caputo’s lively suggestion that the name of God harbors a “shock to 
the system” of the reigning order, Merton was well aware that invocation of the absolute and 
unchanging will of God too often functions to stop conversation and to label critical thinking as 
disobedience. To paraphrase Romans 8:31, if God is for something, who can be against? Are 
human deliberations, reasoning, and autonomy casually swatted aside in the face of the absolute 
divine fiat? 
Merton recognized the problem of God as “other” in relation to humanity, which classical 
humanisms from Feuerbach and Marx to the later existentialists rejected as alienation: when God 
is imagined as being in competition with humanity, freedom itself becomes sinful. At this level, 
Merton suggested, both classical theists and a(nti)theists from Marx to Nietzsche to Camus 
orbited the same absolute God; where the former submitted to a God whom they interpreted as 
omnibenevolent, or at least so far above humanity as to be beyond questioning, the latter rebelled 
against the image of a tyrannical God who imposed the (arbitrary) divine will from above in a 
spectacle of power and control. 
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Chapter 2: Hesiod’s Prometheus: Merton on God and Human Freedom in Christianity 
 
 In a recent interview with “60 Minutes,” Catholic Cardinal Sean O’Malley notoriously 
said, “If I were founding a church, I’d love to have women priests. But Christ founded it, and 
what he has given us is something different” (Kandra). That is, the will of Jesus (as understood 
in a Catholic magisterial context) is absolute, beyond questioning; believers must presume that 
“Christ would never ask us to do something immoral” (Kandra), even if there is no rational 
explanation for why Christ might issue a command that, even the cardinal admitted, looks 
unreasonable. Liberal rebuttals that Jesus did not imagine ordinations of men OR women still 
orbit the same underlying assumption: Jesus’ will, whatever it is, is the real linchpin of truth. 
Paul Lakeland noted the dangers in the absolutist tendencies of an ecclesiology for which the 
true society of the church “implies absolute consensus, agreement in desire, and entire harmony 
among its members, and this is exactly (as Augustine reiterates again and again) what the Church 
provides, and that in which salvation, the restoration of being, consists” (Milbank 402). However 
benign the totalizing impulse might (or might not) be here, it remains totalizing; the unchanging 
will of God leaves little room for dissent, critique, or even dialogue. At most what might change 
is human understanding, but the goal “that they may be one” (JN 17:21) remains univocity, 
bringing all people to obedience to God. In this section I will examine Merton’s experience of 
the relationship of God to human freedom as mediated by the monastic community in which he 
spent his adult life, the Order of the Cistercians of the Strict Observance, also known as the 
Trappists. 
 The theology which was at the heart of Merton’s formative years in the monastery 
dovetailed well with his early desire to find an authority to whom he could give his obedience. 
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His initial, pious impulse to enter his monastic community was at least partly based on a sense 
that he had badly botched his young life and could not trust himself to lead his own life in ways 
that were not self-destructive. Projecting his distrust of himself onto the world, he came to the 
monastery with a highly dualistic conception of the relationship between the sacred monastic life 
and the secular world; on his first visit to Gethesemani in April of 1941, he wrote in his journal, 
“This is the center of America. I had wondered what was holding the country together, what has 
been keeping the universe from cracking to pieces and falling apart” (Inchausti, American 
Prophecy 21). This model of monasticism which was in vogue during Merton’s early years at 
Gethsemani understood the monastery as a “spiritual dynamo” generating energy by the perfect 
observance of its horarium. Writing years later and with a more critical lens, Merton explained 
the worldview within which his early monastic life took root: “Faith assures us that the monastic 
machine is exerting an irresistible influence on God who, it is assumed, takes a mysterious 
pleasure in the operation of this ingenious toy. The legal clockwork of monasticism has been 
specially devised by the Church to enchant the Almighty to cunningly manipulate His power” 
(Merton, World of Action 39). The worldview in which God needed to be manipulated by 
monastic rituals to produce effects for the Church and the world created a situation within which 
monasticism could understand its intensely legalistic structure as “relevant,” literally keeping 
God from venting His wrath upon the world. However, doing so fed upon a fetishistic view of 
God that played to a monastic “superiority complex” that paradoxically saved by its prayers a 
world that it rejected and saw in a fundamentally negative light. 
In the early years of his monastic life Merton enjoyed the “escape from freedom” of not 
being subject to his own unpredictable whims, since he was bound by the heavy discipline of the 
monastic horarium, but by the late 1940s he found himself chafing against the unnecessary 
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hardships, the limited opportunities for solitude, travel and study, and the imposition of the 
orders of his monastic superiors as the unquestionable will of God. By the early 1950s Merton 
petitioned to leave the Trappist order to transfer to the Carthusians, an order of hermits that 
would afford him more silence and solitude than the highly community-minded Trappists, but his 
request was denied. In his 1953 book The Sign of Jonas, he discussed his desire for greater 
solitude and the community’s refusal to give it to him (at that point), struggling to reconcile his 
faith in the “will of God” that he remain in a monastery which had become so antithetical to his 
desires. He reflected, “Like the prophet Jonas, whom God ordered to go to Nineveh, I found 
myself with an almost uncontrollable desire to go in the opposite direction. God pointed one way 
and all my ‘ideals’ pointed in the other…like Jonas himself I find myself traveling toward my 
destiny in the belly of a paradox” (Merton, Sign of Jonas 10-11). At this early point in his 
theological maturation, he could only see this as an indication of the basic wrongness of his 
desires and the lessons to be learned from obedience to authority. 
As he grew in confidence of his own maturity, Merton simultaneously grew into a more 
realistic acknowledgement of the potential of religion to be as a force for organized narcissism. 
His attitude toward his monastic leadership grew increasingly critical as he saw them clinging 
doggedly to external practices that were rooted in beliefs that were fundamentally Promethean, 
built on a negative view of the world and preferring the production of pseudo-holiness to a 
critical stance rooted in love of the world. Writing to Herbert Mason, he lamented, 
 
“I tell you frankly that my present struggle with the institutional aspect of religion is 
enormous and almost overwhelming. It is tempting to ruin the whole thing by 
dramatizing it as something Promethean, as if truth were something I had to conquer and 
bring back into the ruins. That would be the most disastrous thing of all. Yet the ruins 
are really ruins. They are cold and without fire, really. The fire that is there has nothing 
to do with the external forms which people so carefully preserve” (Witness 262). 
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Merton tellingly distinguished the true “fire” of religion from the institutional manifestations 
which had lost sight of the depth dimension of transformation of consciousness in favor of 
performance of exterior patterns of behavior. Further, he critiqued the easy conflation of divine 
and ecclesial authority into a force of finality: “What a shame that all through the Church the 
‘will of God’ can so easily resolve itself into the will of an Italian undersecretary in the Holy 
Office” (Vow of Conversation 59). 
Additionally, Merton dealt for years with the fickle censors of his Trappist religious 
community, who had refused publication of sections of his writings that they deemed too 
scandalous and even forbade him to write about topics such as nuclear war as not being fitting 
for a monk. In a letter to peace activist Jim Forest, Merton complained not only about the 
silencing but about the entire spirit of authoritarianism that he saw in his monastic community 
and in the Catholic hierarchy more broadly. He noted his abbot’s praise of unthinking obedience 
and fury at autonomy in the monastic context: “Dom James in Chapter today voiced the highest 
praise for those who simply ‘run with the herd.’ These are his own words. He extolled those who 
do not think for themselves but conform. He regrets that ‘conformism’ is regarded as a bad trait 
by those who seek ‘only liberty to do their own will’” (Merton, Vow of Conversation 78). After 
being ordered not to write on nuclear warfare and peace because it “falsifies the monastic 
message,” Merton reflected, “Imagine that: the thought that a monk might be deeply enough 
concerned with the issue of nuclear war to voice a protest against the arms race, is supposed to 
bring the monastic life into disrepute. Man, I think that it might just possibly salvage a last shred 
of repute for an institution that many consider to be dead on its feet” (Hidden Ground of Love 
267). Writing to Forest several years later on the same subject, after the publication of Pope John 
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XXIII’s encyclical Pacem in Terris, Merton slyly noted, “I think I told you I wrote to the Abbot 
General and said it was a good thing Pope John didn’t have to get his encyclical through our 
censors: and could I now start up again?’” (Hidden Ground of Love 274). 
In a brief but intense correspondence during the last two years of his life, Merton debated 
with the feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether the viability of monastic life in the 
woods of Kentucky as a genuine form of protest: she urged him to “get with it” and leave a 
monastic tradition which had confused rejection of the “powers and principalities” of the world 
with rejection of God’s good creation. He agreed that “monasticism had ‘lost its soul’ insofar as 
it had become committed to an ironbound institutionalism built on a perverse doctrine of 
authority-humility-obedience” (Hidden Ground of Love 502). Even more, the monastic structure 
made it “worse than anywhere else in the Church, insofar as the emphasis on perfect obedience 
as ‘the’ monastic virtue (which of course it is not) puts the monk bound hand and foot in the 
power of his ‘prelate’ (now no longer charismatic and chosen spiritual Father but his boss and 
feudal lord and maybe general in chief)” (Hidden Ground of Love 504). Here Merton 
underscored that his problem was not with the authority of spiritual maturity which should be the 
hallmark of the abbot, but with the authoritarianism of exercising control over the monks’ lives. 
Merton concluded his correspondence with Ruether by expressing his hope that living as a 
hermit on the monastery property (1965-8) afforded him a critical vantage point from which to 
get out from under both monastic and secular authoritarianisms. 
 While in his more mature years he was less willing to equate the will of his superiors 
with the voice of God and raged at what he saw as backwards decision making, he continued to 
believe that the challenge of listening to other voices than his own was a key to gaining wisdom. 
Merton knew that it would be disastrous to simply assert his own will in ego-gratification against 
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his monastic superiors, both because it would not succeed and because it would simply reinforce 
the willfulness that the conflict promoted in him. Despite his struggles with his monastic 
authorities, however, he believed that being challenged to question his own will, his own ego and 
his own way of thinking was transformative, opening a third way beyond simple submission and 
the “Promethean” conquest of truth by a show of rebellion. After one of many denied requests to 
participate in the monastic conversation beyond Gethsemani, Merton wrote in his journal, “So 
that is the vow of obedience. You submit yourself also to somebody else’s prejudice and to his 
myths and to the worship of his fetishes. Well, I have made the vow and will keep it, and will see 
why I keep it, and will try at the same time not to let myself be involved in the real harm that can 
come from a wrong kind of submission” (Spiritual Master 187). While he knew that simple 
obedience, the “first naïveté” of simply accepting his superiors’ will as unquestionably correct, 
was itself harmful to human freedom, he knew better than to give in to seeing no higher authority 
than his own will. This tension would endure throughout Merton’s writings on obedience and 
freedom as he matured: understanding monastic obedience as a means of training himself away 
from too quickly relying on his own ego, but without simply handing himself over to the will of 
the superior. He noted in his journal that 
the will of God is not a ‘fate’ to which we submit but a creative act in our life 
producing something absolutely new (or failing to do so)…Our cooperation 
(seeking first the Kingdom of God) consists not solely in conforming to laws but 
in opening our wills out to this creative act, which must be retrieved in and by us - 
by the will of God…I must lead a new life, and a new world must come into 
being. But not by my plans and my agitation (Merton, The Intimate Merton 158). 
 
Beyond mere petulance about being hemmed in by the small-mindedness of his abbot, 
Merton saw unthinking religious obedience as a training ground for participation in atrocity, for 
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“doing one’s duty” without considering what that duty might be.
6
 In the wake of horrors from the 
Holocaust and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the atrocities in Vietnam and the racist 
slogans and actions that opposed the civil rights movement, Merton saw that labeling critical 
thinking as disobedience encouraged idealization of superiors, misplacement of loyalty, and 
irresponsibility for one’s actions. Such theology legitimated evil by praising the Christian who 
“gave heroic witness to his God and his faith by a meek, unquestioning obedience even unto 
death in submission to a Church authority that ordered him to submit to a civil authority that was 
not necessarily Christian - perhaps even anti-Christian” (Merton, Nonviolent Alternative 195). 
Discussing the case of Franz Jaegerstaetter, an Austrian Catholic who was executed in 1943 for 
refusing to join the German army, Merton noted that he 
was treated as a rebel, disobedient to lawful authority, a traitor to his country. He was 
accused of being selfish, self-willed, not considering his family, neglecting his duty to 
his children…that he was not sufficiently informed to judge whether or not the war was 
just…Thousands of Catholics, including many priests, were serving in the armies, and 
therefore he should not try to be ‘more Catholic than the Church’ (Nonviolent 
Alternative 134). 
 
Merton concluded by noting the irony of the statement issued by the Catholic bishop of Linz, 
that while Jaegerstaetter may have acted from an “innocently erroneous conscience,” the real 
heroes were “the Catholic young men, the priests and the seminarians who died in Hitler’s 
armies…acting in the light of ‘a clear and correct conscience’” (Nonviolent Alternative 138). 
That there was no connection between a theology of submission to the will of a heteronomous 
God and to that of Hitler was simply unthinkable for Merton. 
                                                 
6 Erich Fromm, with whom Merton carried on a fifteen-year correspondence, noted the thematic similarity of the 
“disobedience” in GN 2-3 and the Prometheus myth and the importance in our time of saying no to unjust 
authority: “human history began with an act of disobedience, and it is not unlikely that it will be terminated by an 
act of obedience” (Disobedience 1). 
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It is perhaps inevitable that Merton’s exploration of the roots of human alienation brought 
him to the symbol of original sin, particularly given the “Promethean” disobedience and theft at 
the heart of GN 2-3. In his earliest writings on Prometheus, Merton read against the conventional 
interpretation of GN 2-3 to justify God’s seemingly heteronomous prohibition on gaining the 
knowledge of good and evil: already possessing the knowledge of good (since he was a “natural 
contemplative” who lived unashamedly and in union with God), Adam ate the fruit to gain an 
experiential knowledge of evil. Recognizing how deeply heteronomous this text seemed, Merton 
even included a footnote to cut off objections to God’s actions in this text: “It should be noted 
that this was objectively a ‘bad tree’ and not simply a good one which Adam was arbitrarily 
forbidden to touch in order that God’s supremacy might be recognized” (New Man 107)
7
. In his 
later writings, Merton shifted away from the sinfulness of disobedience to the “sin”/alienation of 
losing the original nakedness in the garden, which he interpreted as a symbol of being 
unashamed of the fundamentally humble, vulnerable character of human life. This vulnerable 
self, which lived in original harmony with self and God, gave way in the formation of a self-
aware self to shame and the production of false selves to cover over that shame. In the monastic 
worldview in which Merton was educated, the goal of the monastic life was retrieval of this 
original unity with God, not by un-knowing, but by a “second naïveté” of growing into trust 
enough to be without a self-constructed self. The salvific task, then, shifted for Merton from 
                                                 
7 Of course, the problems with such a reading are legion: among others, they include failing to ask what is so 
objectively bad about the knowledge of good and evil, why this non-heteronomous God would punish the man and 
woman for not obeying, why the tree would be called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil if they already 
knew good, and why God would put an “objectively bad tree” in the garden in the first place! Erich Fromm reads 
this story as a prototype of authoritarian ethics: “The sin of Adam and Eve is not explained in terms of the act 
itself; earing from the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not bad per se; in fact, both the Jewish and the 
Christian religions agree that the ability to differentiate between good and evil is a basic virtue. The sin was 
disobedience, the challenge to the authority of God, who was afraid that man, having already ‘become as one of 
Us, to know good and evil,’ could ‘put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life and live forever.’” See Man for 
Himself, 22. 
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healing a separation from God to healing one’s separation from oneself, in particular retrieving a 
vulnerable, “naked” selfhood in all of its contingent human reality. Drawing on Fromm’s 
definition of neurosis as “an individual’s successful adaptation to a neurotic society” (Cooper 
236), Merton reinterpreted the universality of original sin in the language of alienation, not from 
a punishing God, but from the simplicity of the human reality in favor of the construction of a 
“false self”. This included not only more “superficial” realities like possessions, physical beauty, 
popularity, but even more subtly, ostensibly “good” realities like education, morality, religiosity: 
anything that might serve as “fig leaves” to cover the fundamental nakedness of the self: 
I use up my life in the desire for pleasures and the thirst for experiences, for 
power, honor, knowledge and love to clothe this false self and construct its 
nothingness into something objectively real. And I wind experiences around 
myself and cover myself with pleasures and glory like bandages in order to make 
myself perceptible to myself and to the world, as if I were an invisible body that 
could only become visible when something visible covered its surface (New Seeds 
35). 
 
Thus Merton suggested that religion is “made profoundly ambiguous by religious people 
themselves”: “Man ‘wishes himself’ (magically) to become godly, holy, gentle, pure, etc…This 
is no more than the religion of those who wish themselves to be in a certain state in which they 
can live with themselves, approve of themselves: for they feel that, when they can approve of 
themselves, God is at peace with them” (Conjectures 154). 
Similarly, Merton rejected theories of salvation which were rooted in a legal transaction 
between Christ and God, as in classical post-Anselmian substitutionary atonement theories
8
, as 
                                                 
8 Critiques of the atonement paradigm, though less ambitious in Merton’s day, have become commonplace: Lisa 
Sowle Cahill notes the “chorus” of scholars who object that “the atonement paradigm sanctifies violence (Denny 
Weaver, Stephen Finlan); worships a divine sadist (Dorothee Soelle); turns God into an omnipotent child abuser 
(Rita Nakashima Brock); speaks no word of salvation to African American women and others resisting oppression 
(Delores Williams); and provides murderous fanatics, fascists, and torturers with validating symbols (Jurgen 
Moltmann, Mark Taylor).” See Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Quaestio Disputata: The Atonement Paradigm: Does it Still Have 
Explanatory Value?” Theological Studies 68 (2007), 418-432, at 419. 
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the very notion of a need to be reconciled to a punishing God produced the very alienation they 
claimed to overcome. This received paradigm amounted, for Merton, to a theological 
justification not only of heteronomy but of tyranny, in which the myth of the fall became the 
very exemplification of the sinfulness of autonomy, so that right relationship with God conceived 
as Other came from convincing God, by one’s submission to church authority and the 
performance of ecclesial practices, not to condemn. The fundamental assumption of this 
soteriological framework was that God’s “neutral” position toward humanity was condemnation, 
so that one could arguably see the goal of the Christian life as “salvation FROM God.” Small 
wonder, for Merton, that the modern atheists would find it not only laughable but despicable that 
Christians could love such a God and propose that this God is the very definition of love. 
In place of the standard Christian conception of salvation as healing of an original 
brokenness or breach in the relationship with God, Merton saw the challenge of retrieving the 
human condition for a humanity which saw it as part of the problem. In an April 1959 letter to 
D.T. Suzuki, Merton wrote that while humanity “had never really been separated from [God] in 
the first place,” the thought that we were separated “was a conviction so great and so strong that 
it amounted to separation…Each one of us began to slave and struggle to make himself a god, 
which he imagined he was supposed to be…This is Original Sin…In this sense there is exclusion 
from paradise. But yet we are in paradise, and once we break free from the false image, we find 
ourselves what we are: and we are ‘in Christ’” (Hidden Ground of Love 564). The idea of a noble 
but futile “struggle to make oneself a god” echoes the language of Merton’s early essays on 
Prometheus: what is alienating is not God, but a vision of the divine-human relationship that 
makes humanity essentially inferior, essentially in the wrong before God. 
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This deconstruction of the relationship between divine and human freedom pointed out 
the other side of standard visions of soteriology, namely the violent and exclusionary 
consequences of failure or refusal to conform to the heteronomous divine will. Writing to the 
Jewish scholar Zalman Schachter in 1962, Merton discussed the possibility of unity among Jews 
and Christians and the political effects in history of imagining Jesus as a rejection of Judaism: 
“When the Christians began to look at Christ as Prometheus…Then they justified war, then they 
justified crusades, then they justified pogroms, then they justified Auschwitz, then they justified 
the bomb, then they justified the Last Judgment: the Christ of Michelangelo is Prometheus, I 
mean the Christ in the Sistine Chapel.  He is whipping sinners with his great Greek muscles” 
(Hidden Ground of Love 535). Without castigating him too much for writing a personal letter 
that was not symbolically impeccable, one may note that Merton distorts his own symbolism, 
missing the distinction between Prometheus himself and Promethean theology: this is indeed a 
Promethean image, but the Sistine Christ is not Prometheus but Zeus, torturing any Prometheans 
who dare to rebel. Despite any quibbling one might do about the consistency of Merton’s 
symbols, it is of absolute significance that Merton placed at the end of the list of escalating 
outpourings of violence the doctrine of the Last Judgment. The Christ he rejected is not an anti-
Semite or a Nazi or a soldier ready to launch a nuclear strike, but the presumably orthodox 
Christian image of Christ “who will come to judge the living and the dead”. This Promethean 
soteriology, avoiding the tortures this Christ has in store for the sinner by falling in line with His 
eternal dictates, has been so thoroughly taken for granted as the backbone of so much of the 
Christian enterprise that the radicality of including it in a list of atrocities like concentration 
camps and nuclear war may not be entirely clear from the outset. In the wake of that kind of 
absolute claim on reality, Merton noted, the legitimization of violence is never far away: 
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‘All right, if we can’t make it to the wedding feast [a Biblical image of the 
eschaton which Merton imagines Jews and Christians sharing] (and we are the 
ones who refused), we can blow up the joint and say it is the Last Judgment.’ 
Well, that’s the way it is the Judgment, and that’s the way men judge themselves, 
and that’s the way the poor and the helpless and the maimed and the blind enter 
into the Kingdom: when the Prometheus types blow the door wide open for them 
(Hidden Ground of Love 535). 
 
Again, the judgment comes because the violent judge themselves and others and blame it on 
God, inflict violence and attribute it to the will of God; the image of the “great Greek” Christ sits 
absolute in his power like Zeus, dispensing a heteronomous punishment upon those who have 
failed to propitiate him. The sharp contrast between the image of the Judgment on the wall of the 
Sistine Chapel and the eschatological image of the wedding feast as a symbol of hospitality and 
welcome exemplifies that Merton’s essays on Prometheus are not merely idle musings. Rather, it 
demonstrates that when religious authority “performs” heteronomy by claiming to speak on 
behalf of God, demanding absolute obedience, and punishing efforts at reasoned dissent, it forces 
people to choose submission or rebellion; rebellion in such a schema is not simply against a 
given religious or political power structure, but against the monarchial God who endorses that 
structure. By constructing a God after their own image and likeness, full of violence and 
punishment, those who worship power thereby inscribe heteronomy into the divine order itself. 
In response to the massive legitimation of violence that he saw at the heart of Christian 
theology, Merton took up the response of the modern humanist atheists that religion evacuates 
humanity’s selfhood by creating a futile and self-destructive relationship with a God who 
destroys human freedom. In the abstraction of religion as an alienating force, “man accepts 
estrangement from himself, projects his own reality outside himself, impoverishes himself, and 
dehumanizes himself, in order to lead what is essentially a fantasy life centered on the abstract 
idea of God” (Love and Living 126). Insofar as humanity is caught up in the formalism of such 
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an ideology, Merton agreed that such a “pseudo-Christianity” can only be anti-humanistic. 
However, he argued (too quickly, perhaps) that this alienating version of religion which 
Feuerbach and Marx rejected is just as surely rejected by the New Testament:
9
 “where there is a 
choice between the good of a suffering person and the claims of formal and established legalism, 
Jesus decides for the person and against the claims of legalistic religion” (Merton, Love and 
Living 128). In so doing, he dismissed the entire systematization of taboos, hierarchies, and truth-
effects that Marx and others saw shielding people from the real work of ameliorating history. 
Merton noted that while such religious practices tend to be associated with narcissistic thinking, 
modern technological culture abounds in its own manifestations of narcissism which function 
analogously to formal religion. To paraphrase Michel Foucault, it is not that everything is bad, 
but that everything is dangerous: the narcissism of the false self finds endless means of 
alleviating the anxiety of one’s existential situation. 
 “This fascination with the self as a central and sole reality to be satisfied and catered to in 
everything is at the root of all idolatrous forms of religion” (Love and Living 131), but the same 
impulse manifests in technocracy, which, despite its impressive capacity to produce, build, 
organize and systematize, runs a grave risk of closing the person in upon the satiation of desires. 
Merton was not only suspicious of religious systematization; he also worried that placing 
absolute faith in scientific truth claims produced a new idolatry which paved the way to 
legitimations of violence. In particular, he noted that even the Jesuit priest and paleontologist 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, for all of the positivity of his overcoming of the body-soul dualism 
                                                 
9 Merold Westphal similarly notes that in its continual critiques of external religiosity, the Bible is as irreligious a 
religious text as one will ever find. Further, he notes the similarity of the “Promethean” critique in the Bible to that 
of the “masters of suspicion”: “Perhaps we need to see Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, along with Luther and Barth, 
as expressing a Promethean protest against all the Zeuses of instrumental reason, the piety that reduces God to a 
means or instrument for achieving our own human purposes with professedly divine power and sanction.” See his 
Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism. New York: Fordham University Press, 1998, 6. 
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that had plagued much of Christian history, was far too quick to affirm science at the cost of 
ignoring or legitimating human suffering. Merton critiqued the evolutionary character of 
Teilhard’s theology, calling it “an optimism which tends to look at existential evil and suffering 
through the small end of the telescope” and noting that he “regarded the dead and wounded of 
Hiroshima with a certain equanimity as inevitable by-products of scientific and evolutionary 
progress” (Literary Essays 216). Such a worldview was its own kind of dualism: instead of 
sacrificing the material realm to the spiritual, Merton saw Teilhard sacrificing people to the 
“omega point” of history, such that his “scientific mystique and long-range view, extending over 
millenia, naturally did not delay overlong to worry about the death of a few thousands here and 
there” (Literary Essays 217). Again, the willingness to bypass the human person for the sake of 
the human nature, for humanity in the abstract, brought out a trend of legitimation of atrocity, 
this time by way of science linked with religion. “Narcissism alienates man and his society in a 
slavery to things - money, machines, commodities, luxuries, fashions, and pseudoculture. The 
idolatrous mentality of narcissism produces a fake humanism which cynically defies man in 
order to cheat him of his human fulfillment and enslave him to the ‘rat race’ for riches, pleasure, 
and power” (Merton, Love and Living 131).
10
 But Merton saw this collective narcissism creating 
levels of alienation and destruction far beyond that of individual psychological pathology, 
leading to what he called “mass man,” a state in which the person is willing to hand over moral 
responsibility to technological and political power structures, accepting conformity as the price 
of meeting their needs. 
                                                 
10 In line with his previous comments about “pseudo-Christianity,” one can only imagine that one outcome of a 
narcissistic worldview is an enslavement to religion, or more precisely to alienating religion as one more 
manifestation of pseudo-culture.  
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Addressing what Joseph McLelland calls “the irony of atheism,” Merton noted the risk 
that atheistic humanisms, cut off from a transcendent source, risk producing a scientific or 
reductionistic view of the human person that could be even more alienating and powerful 
structure than the alienating religions they rightly reject. “Thus,” noted Merton, “it is not difficult 
for the abstract and scientific doctrines of modern humanism to become means by which the 
individual person is reduced to subjection to man in the abstract…this vast and awful 
abstractness hovers over the abyss of mass society to bring forth from it the antihumanist and 
irresponsible monstrosity that is mass-man” (Love and Living 133). Even the seemingly 
optimistic worldview of theorists like Marx takes on an ominous tone to the degree that their 
theories deal with humanity in the abstract and reduce the human person to human nature; 
rejecting religion for imposing a superstructure of estrangement on humanity, they risk doing the 
same thing through so categorizing the person that the “truth” of that person’s life becomes an 
externally imposed force that deforms the person who does not fit that abstraction. Without 
endorsing a return to a facile heteronomy, Merton argued, “ultimately there is no humanism 
without God. Marx thought that humanism had to be atheistic, and this was because he did not 
understand God any better than the self-complacent formalists whom he criticized. He thought, 
as they did, that God was an idea, an abstract essence, forming part of an intellectual 
superstructure built to justify economic alienation” (Merton, Collected Poems 390). Dealing in 
abstraction, in Merton’s estimation, lent itself to a self-contained logic that culminated in racism, 
doublespeak, and legitimations of violence: “To shut out the person and to refuse to consider him 
as a person, as an other self, we resort to the impersonal ‘law’ and ‘nature.’…In effect, we are 
considering our nature in the concrete and his nature in the abstract” (Seeds of Destruction 254-
5). This false abstraction of the individual, the social order, the political or economic or military 
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regime, paradoxically undertaken in the name of a humanistic rejection of the gods, could only 
lead further into alienation. 
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Chapter 3: Aeschylus’s Prometheus: Merton on “Death of God” and Literary-Existentialist 
Views of the God-Human Relation 
 
In a journal entry dated January 17, 1960, over a year after writing his original 
meditations on Prometheus and Promethean theology, Merton wrote, 
“After dinner – read the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus. Shattered by it. I do not 
know when I have read anything so stupendous and so completely 
contemporary…A great religious experience. Prometheus, archetypal 
representation of the suffering Christ. But we must go deep into this. Prometheus 
startles us by being more fully Christ than the Lord of our own clichés – I mean, 
he is free from all the falsifications and limitations of our hackneyed vision which 
has slowly emptied itself of reality” (Search for Solitude 370). 
 
Merton’s original essay had been informed only by Hesiod’s version of the Prometheus myth, 
and gaining the perspective of Aeschylus’ version of the myth prompted him to revise his 
“Meditation” and add a preface titled “A Note: Two Faces of Prometheus” in which he clarified 
the distinction between Hesiod’s and Aeschylus’ versions of the Prometheus myth. This revised 
essay appeared in 1960 in Merton’s book The Behavior of Titans and again, in slightly edited 
form, in his 1965 book Raids on the Unspeakable. In a December 17, 1960 letter to his friend 
James Laughlin, the founder of New Directions publishing house, Merton wrote, “Of course my 
commentary on Prometheus is a little confusing. It is certainly not a critique of the Prometheus 
of Aeschylus (rather of his Zeus). I tried to say that in a little note which will only leave the 
reader confused, I am afraid” (Merton/Laughlin 160). As Patrick O’Connell noted, “The 
confusion comes only if the reader expects the Prometheus of Aeschylus to make an appearance 
in the ‘Meditation’ proper, which had been written before Merton’s close association with the 
drama of Aeschylus” (Merton Encyclopedia 371). 
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In hindsight (since he wrote his original meditation before he had read Aeschylus’ 
version of the myth), he reinterpreted his original meditation as a retrieval of the Aeschylean 
Prometheus from a worldview that he argued had been infected since the time of the Renaissance 
with the spirit of Hesiod’s Prometheus. This spirit came to symbolize not only modernity in a 
secular, technocratic sense, but more fundamentally, a view of “man and the universe as static 
and definitively given realities which do not change in any important sense: realities which 
simply have to be understood and accepted in their unchanging natures” (Love and Living 125). 
This negative model of the Prometheus myth presented a view that “life and love are somehow a 
punishment. That nothing can ever be really good in it. That life is slavery and sorrow because of 
Zeus, and because Prometheus resisted Zeus. That therefore life is nothing but a wheel upon 
which man is broken like a slave…” (Merton, Titans 13). In the light of the newfound depth of 
the Aeschylean myth, Merton framed his meditation on Hesiod’s Prometheus as “a rejection of 
the negative, modern myth of Prometheus. It is a return to the archaic, Aeschylean and positive 
aspect of Prometheus, which is, at the same time, to my mind, deeply and implicitly Christian” 
(Titans 14). In highlighting the static character that he saw in Hesiod’s worldview, Merton 
aligned abstracting religion and abstracting technocracy, shifting the divide from atheism/theism 
to alienation/freedom. This unusual interpretation broke the standard association of secular 
humanism with the Aeschylean Prometheus and religious orthodoxy with Hesiod’s Zeus; Merton 
thereby came to associate the “living God” predominantly with human freedom rather than with 
religion, opening the possibility of poising God and Christ against religion as itself subject to 
becoming an alienating and abstracting force. Where atheist humanisms claimed to follow 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus in their rejection of religious antihumanism, Merton argued that they in 
fact orbited the same worldview, namely, that of Hesiod, and that the same seeds of 
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antihumanism lie in atheist humanisms insofar as the real enemy of humanity is not God but 
sovereignty, the real division not between theism and atheism but between abstraction and the 
contradictions and freedom of the concrete person. 
 Searching for glimmers of hope on a theological landscape that was too often concerned 
with in-house conversations and ecclesial trivia, Merton noted in particular the rise of the “death 
of God” theologies in the 1960s as efforts to take seriously the “secular city” in a way that did 
not simply repeat traditional answers and to reflect on the apparent lack of access to and interest 
in questions about God in the secular arena. While recognizing the diversity of their methods and 
outcomes and not signing on completely to their results, Merton understood and approved the 
“effort to reshape the language of religion in a last-minute attempt to save it from a plague of 
abstractness and formalism” (Nonviolent Alternative 236) which, as noted above, distinguished 
true religion from mere narcissism. Caught up in that reappraisal was, inevitably, a critique of 
sedimented institutional beliefs and practices:  
‘the Churches’ have created a separate world within the world, a world claiming 
to be ‘sacred,’ while surreptitiously gaining and retaining for themselves every 
possible worldly advantage and privilege. This ecclesiastical world identifies 
itself as ‘holier’ and ‘better’ than any other society by virtue of external rites and 
signs, and presumes to condemn and vilify all that is real, valid, alive, creative, 
forwardlooking in order to maintain its own traditional advantage (Merton, Faith 
and Violence 245). 
 
Thus, the seeming blasphemy of the “Death of God” rhetoric was itself paradoxically religious, 
“a necessary iconoclastic protest against every form of popular religion which has blasphemed 
God by trying to sell him on the same terms as next year’s Chevrolet” (Merton, Faith and 
Violence 193). Questions of “belief in” God, whether theistic or atheistic, paradoxically 
entrenched this problem by making God an object “out there,” focusing on God’s existence or 
nonexistence but taking for granted the kind of God that was being affirmed or denied. In this 
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context, Merton approvingly cited Gabriel Vahanian, the “death of God” theologian who most 
resonated with his thought: “Biblical religion shows us once for all that man’s basic obligation to 
God is iconoclasm. That sounds wild, but it is only a reformulation of the first two 
commandments” (Faith and Violence 197). Rather than breaking with the existence of God per 
se, Merton saw Vahanian breaking with the classical God-images that had been taken with 
enough finality to harden into absolutes. Thus, the rebellious character of Aeschylus’ Prometheus 
was not rebellion against God, but legitimate rebellion against every idol (and idolator) which 
stands in the way of God: not only was this justified for Merton, its opposite was blasphemous. 
 For all of his appreciation of their insight into the secular problem of imagining God, the 
various Death of God theologies did not go far enough for Merton, insofar as he believed that 
their lampoon of religion, despite its effort to be prophetic, ended up focusing only on the 
exterior manifestations of narcissistic religion, without sufficiently critiquing the hostility to life 
in the depths of both heteronomous religion and technocratic secularity.  This focus on the 
superficial failed to recover a genuine depth, leaving no significant alternative to “acquiescence 
to political totalism, the police state - whether capitalist or Communist makes little difference. 
Either way, by conventional Christianity or by the Death of God, we seem to end up rendering 
everything to Caesar” (Faith and Violence 197). The shared endpoint of totalism pointed to the 
real problem for Merton: while a large percentage of Americans continued believe in God in his 
time, or at least the idea of God, the real problem was not simply making metaphysical assertions 
about the existence or non-existence of a Supreme Being, but the underlying legitimation of 
bourgeois secularity and the violence that supported it. He noted: 
The enthusiasm for the secular city coincides with fervent praise of American 
affluence, which is in fact rooted in the enormous military-industrial complex and 
therefore in the Vietnam war [sic]…its substitution of ‘history’ and ‘politics’ for 
metaphysics and religion may run the risk of ending in conformism, acquiescence, 
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and passive approval of the American managerial society, affluent economy and 
war-making power politics (Faith and Violence 248). 
 
Conventional Christianity on the one hand had failed, in Merton’s opinion, by so focusing on its 
formal identity markers and on its claims of superiority to the secular world that it had missed 
the kairos of confronting “the world” on behalf of the world. On the other hand, the Death of 
God theologians, appropriately rejecting the formal split of the natural world and the 
supernatural order, had failed by losing the distinction between the world as good and the world 
as fallen. Their strategic avoidance of “fallenness” was an understandable rejection of exclusivist 
and world-denying models of “original sin,” but they failed to reckon with the depth of evil in 
the world and with the shortcomings of modernity: “The fervent proselytizer who wants to make 
converts share his own experience of being saved is replaced by the Christian who is completely 
‘hip’ to the modern world and will not listen for a moment to anyone who he suspects does not 
experience the modern world exactly as he does” (Faith and Violence 243). 
 Against the failure of the death of God theologians to critique the violence of the modern 
age, Merton admired Albert Camus as an exemplar of both the quest for meaningfulness and the 
struggle for liberation in the face of overbearing powers and a seemingly absurd universe. 
Merton read his work with great seriousness, going so far as to write seven essays on various 
aspects of his thought and working on a book on Camus that his 1968 death left unfinished 
(Hidden Ground of Love 430). Prometheus was a significant figure for Camus as well, perhaps 
more significant than for Merton: he staged Prometheus Bound in 1937, wrote an essay on 
rebellion in 1946 entitled “Prometheus in Hell,” and used Prometheus as the symbol of the 
second cycle of his work, with The Rebel as a centerpiece. Jeffrey Isaac noted the multifaceted 
character of Camus’ consideration of Prometheus, particularly his critique of a dehumanizing 
impulse at the heart of much modern humanism: 
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What is the meaning of the myth of Prometheus, Camus asks, in a world that 
worships technology and human mastery? ‘If Prometheus were to reappear,’ he 
suggests, ‘modern man would treat him as the gods did long ago; they would nail 
him to the rock in the name of the very humanism he was the first to symbolize.’ 
Today’s executioners, as Camus put it, are humanists, and today’s humanists are 
likely to be executioners. In the name of their humanism they incarcerate and 
annihilate human freedom and intelligence (118). 
 
Sharing Camus’ concern that humanist systems contained within themselves the seeds of 
abstraction that fed antihumanism, Merton repeatedly commented that, despite the antireligious 
tenor of much of his writings, Camus nevertheless “can be called a ‘religious’ thinker insofar as 
he appeals to an obscure and ultimate faith. No doubt it is not a theological faith, but a faith in 
man, a faith in revolt itself, a faith in the value of an existential witness which says ‘No’ to the 
absurd” (Literary Essays 221). The “religious” quality of literature that Camus admired was, 
Merton believed, fundamentally about a tragic exploration of suffering and a reproach to 
Christianity for sublimating the innocent to violence under the aegis of the benevolence of God. 
 Camus’ Promethean rebellion against the absurd character of life manifested as an anti-
nihilist rebellion against a world that needed fixing but had no one at the wheel to make it right, 
but he also rejected the Christian impulse to believe in a deity who could have aided the 
suffering but chose not to do so. In The Plague, when Rieux protested against the injustice of the 
death of an innocent child, Camus had the Jesuit Father Paneloux respond, “Ah, now I 
understand what grace is.” Merton explained this statement in the voice of Paneloux: 
Now I know what it is that distinguishes me from this unbeliever here. He cannot 
see that God is to be loved even when he arbitrarily destroys the innocent. He 
does not have the grace to believe; consequently he sees only cruelty, and thinks 
God is wrong. But I have the grace to see that even when he is arbitrary and cruel, 
God is always right. Grace, then, is that which gives one the ability to submit to a 
God who acts like an arbitrary tyrant. It gives the power to submit to a will we do 
not understand and even to adore and love what appears horrible (Literary Essays 
212). 
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The fundamentally Promethean character of Camus’ rejection of what he saw as the Christian 
response to evil was clear: to prefer an unjust divine order to acknowledging the absurd is to 
cooperate with the absurd. Merton noted, “This is an idea that Camus finds revolting. And he is 
right. It is also an idea which Camus believes to be essential to Christianity, and he is wrong: the 
idea that God is essentially unjust, and to be loved as such!” (Literary Essays 213). Merton 
praised Camus (as he did Prometheus) insofar as Camus was more serious in his response to 
injustice than those Christians who simply submitted to naked power and injustice as “fate” 
because they attributed it to God. However, he suggested that Christians could share in the 
confrontation with evil without blaming God, since God need not, must not be imagined as the 
all-powerful being who nevertheless allowed evil to have its way - such a God would be “in fact 
a monstrous and arbitrary theological idol” (Literary Essays 213). On the contrary, where Camus 
clung to divine omnipotence while forfeiting the goodness of God, Merton clung to the goodness 
of God and reimagined power in terms of revolt rather than sovereignty — paradoxically, the 
very position that Camus himself upheld as a pinnacle of true morality. Irony abounded that 
Camus’ assumption of a more or less “orthodox” God-image led him to reject Christianity, 
where Merton’s emerging theology would be somewhat less orthodox but was, for him, the key 
to seeing any kind of future for Christianity. Merton approvingly quoted Camus’ famous 
statement, “I do not believe in God, but I am not therefore an atheist” (Literary Essays 95), 
indicating the basically religious (in Merton’s existential sense) character of Camus’ work as an 
ethical rejection of a sick God-image which he associated with classical Christian conceptions of 
God. I suggest, however, that Merton would reverse it for himself: “I do believe in God, but I am 
not therefore a theist”: by freeing himself from the constraints of accepting classical theism, 
Merton was able to reinterpret the problem of God and human freedom away from the 
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bifurcation of alienated heteronomy or alienated autonomy which both shared the same God-
image. 
 Merton was certainly aware of the double-edged sword of “playing with fire” in the 
scientific era, which he saw in the potential for technology cut off from wisdom and love to 
become a tool of atrocity, and the particular challenge of a religious response to technology and 
the secularity which drove its development. While this was not Merton’s primary use of 
Prometheus, in his later works he again repurposed Prometheus to symbolize the muscular, 
aggressive approach to life that he associated in particular with the West. In his late work Faith 
and Violence Merton referred to “the Angel of the West - the Power or principality which is the 
‘Guiding Spirit’ of European-American civilization” (193). In the April 1968 preface to the 
Japanese edition of The New Man, which appeared as “Rebirth and the New Man in Christianity” 
in his posthumously published book Love and Living, Merton explicitly named that spirit as 
Prometheus. He noted, “The West has lived for thousands of years under the sign of the Titan, 
Prometheus, the fire stealer, the man of power who defies heaven in order to get what he himself 
desires. The West has lived under the sign of will, the love of power, action, and domination. 
Hence, Western Christianity has often been associated with a spiritual will-to-power and an 
instinct for organization and authority” (Love and Living 181). Similarly, Merton remained 
skeptical about the risks of scientific advancement without further developing wisdom, 
concerned that the scientific mode of inquiry was based in a system of treating things and people 
as external objects to be understood by accumulating knowledge, an ultimately dualistic and 
alienating paradigm of knowing. He saw this paradigm as endemic to Cartesian thought in 
particular, noting that it “began with an attempt to reach God as object by starting from the 
thinking self. But when God becomes object, he sooner or later ‘dies,’ because God as object is 
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ultimately unthinkable” (Merton, Birds of Appetite 23). In particular, Merton saw great spiritual 
difficulty caught up in the rise of the Cartesian ego, which he interpreted as a mode of 
consciousness in which “self-awareness as a thinking, observing, measuring and estimating ‘self’ 
is absolutely primary” (Zen 22). Such a worldview leads to the inevitable “death of God” insofar 
as God becomes another object, “because God as object is ultimately unthinkable” and “contains 
so many internal contradictions that it becomes entirely nonnegotiable except when it is 
hardened into an idol that is maintained in existence by a sheer act of will” (Merton, Zen 23). 
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Chapter 4: Merton’s Tragic Religiosity: Sophia as Theopoetics of Human Freedom 
 
 Merton argued that while the Cartesian spirit had infiltrated the Christian West to the 
point that the “death of God” had become an inevitability, there remained an alternative in a 
return to the primacy and immediacy of the experience of Being. Existentialism and Zen in 
particular came to function for Merton as correctives to the overly intellectualizing and 
abstracting tendencies he saw in much Cartesian/Christian thinking in the West. Coming to 
existentialism through the thought of Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, both Catholic 
Thomists, Merton eventually came to draw on Martin Heidegger’s work as the philosophical 
basis of his thinking, largely because of Heidegger’s sense of a direct, intuitive apprehension of 
being and the overcoming of the rigid division of subject and object. “What appealed to him 
about existentialism was its avoidance of abstraction, its molding of thought to concrete 
existential realities, and its focus on the present as the matrix of life and experience” (Labrie, 
Inclusive Imagination 50). The subject-object distinction which reified both self and other into 
discrete players in a status hierarchy of beings gave way for Merton to a unifying ground of 
being; in effect, the self-aware subject emerges from and is united with other subjects in this 
ground, rather than beginning with the rational and absolute self of the cogito as ground of 
experience. 
 Merton saw in Zen a similar existentialist character insofar as it sought to bring its 
adherents into direct contact with reality, dismantling the abstract codes block access to the 
person in his/her/hir concrete situatedness. This is not to deny the role of language in shaping 
experience, but as Merton put it, “The taste for Zen in the West is in part a healthy reaction of 
people exasperated with the heritage of four centuries of Cartesianism: the reification of 
39 
 
 
concepts, idolization of the reflexive consciousness, flight from being into verbalism, 
mathematics, and rationalization. Descartes made a fetish out of the mirror in which the self 
finds itself. Zen shatters it” (Conjectures 285). Labrie noted that Merton’s late writings about 
God tended toward more ontological and impersonal imagery (Inclusive Imagination 52), which 
bolstered his efforts to find points of contact between Zen and Christian contemplation precisely 
at the level of direct encounter with reality and avoidance of abstraction. In the Christian context, 
this alienating reification manifests in the demand of total self-surrender to Christ, in particular 
as mediated through the authority of the scriptures or ecclesial authorities. The Zen impulse, on 
the other hand, is to “rely on nothing but ‘the truth’ as they experience it directly. Hence, they 
must not even prefer an authoritative statement by the Buddha to the direct insight into truth in 
their own lives” (Mystics 219). The search for this directness of insight did not guarantee 
absolute clarity, but it demonstrated Merton’s frustration with metaphysical, speculative and 
ecclesial apparatuses that cut people off from their own lives and added insult to injury by giving 
divine legitimation to that alienation. 
 Merton argued that something of this interior solitude and freedom from the exterior 
production of selfhood is present in every deep spiritual experience, whether religious, moral, or 
artistic, but he also noted that the archetypal symbols and rituals of the ancient cultures of both 
East and West favor the cultivation of the interior life more readily than the objectifying 
consciousness that he associates with the modern West. While Merton strained theologically 
against the limits of his Christology to understand the relationship of Christ to the other religions 
of the world, he referenced numerous parallels in other religions to the reconfiguration of 
consciousness which he called the retrieval of the true self, such as the Buddha-mind and the 
“original face before you were born” from the Zen tradition and the fana (annihilation) and baqa 
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(reintegration) of the Sufi tradition. While he did not ascribe explicitly to the notion that all 
religions “meet at the top” in their mystical manifestations, he did hold that in all traditions there 
are a minority group who pursue the religious quest more intensely in search of “a transcendent 
dimension of life beyond that of the ordinary empirical self and of ethical and pious observance” 
(Merton, Spiritual Master 230). However, he also noted that religions held no monopoly on that 
more broadly religious quest; in particular, he agreed with the Death of God theologians that the 
notion of “the religious” had become so deeply ambiguous that it no longer communicated the 
basic meaningfulness of the depth dimension of human experience. More directly, and more 
radically for Merton the monk, “the religious” had been co-opted by “religion” by being “mixed 
up with confessionalism, with belonging to this or that religious institution, with making and 
advertising a particular kind of religious commitment, with a special style in devotion or piety, or 
even with a certain exclusiveness in the quest for an experience which has to be sacred and not 
secular” (Literary Essays 98). One might suggest that by separating the external “boundary 
markers” of religious affiliation from “religion” as a pursuit of the existential depths of human 
existence, Merton hinted at what the Continental tradition might call “religion without religion.” 
While he continued to function and identify as a Catholic monk and priest to the end of 
his life, the reality that “religion” had been so co-opted by violence and a lack of a critical spirit 
that Merton turned to wisdom, sapientia, understood as deep synthesis of systematic knowledge 
and intuition, to point beyond both to the creation of a space of transformed selfhood. Merton 
opened his 1961 book The Behavior of Titans with “Prometheus: A Meditation” and concluded 
with two essays on the other great pre-Socratic firebringer, the philosopher Herakleitos the 
Obscure (c 535 – c 475 BCE), a contemporary of Aeschylus and a philosopher of ceaseless 
change. Merton positioned Herakleitos as an ally to Prometheus in opposing the “Olympian 
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formalism” of Hesiod and Homer, a worldview characterized by “static and changeless order” 
and “the laws of mechanical necessity…, the ritualism and the rigidity of the conventional 
exterior cult, the static condition of a society that feared all that was not ‘ordinary’” (Titans 75). 
Linking this image with the worldview of Hesiod to open a reflection on the modern era, Merton 
used the Prometheus of Aeschylus as a counter to this objectifying alienation of humanity: “In 
Prometheus, the Firebearer, we see a similar revolt against Olympian formalism. We notice that 
the Titan, Prometheus, represents the older, more primitive, more ‘Dionysian’ earth gods of 
archaic Greece, in rebellion against the newly constructed tyranny of Zeus” (Titans 86). 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus thus pointed away from conventional associations of the 
Firebringer with the dangers of “playing God” with unfettered technological advancement (a 
common but odd connection for a figure whose very name means “Foresight”) back to a 
synthesis of scientia (systematic knowledge) and intellectus (intuitive understanding) in the 
highest form of cognition, sapientia (wisdom), which “embraces the entire scope of man’s life 
and all its meaning” and “grasps the ultimate truths to which science and intuition only point” 
(Merton, Literary Essays 99). Therefore, Merton noted, it is important to consider whether 
Prometheus’ fire “symbolizes science or wisdom. One might argue the point at length but in the 
end the only satisfactory solution is that it symbolizes both. For Prometheus, fire is science 
perfected by wisdom and integrally united with wisdom in a ‘hidden harmony.’ For the 
Olympians it is perhaps true to say that wisdom is not important, and that what they begrudge 
men is science, because science means power” (Titans 86). From Merton’s perspective, the 
Prometheans who invoked Aeschylus as rationalist and rebel against God were paradoxically 
acting out of the Olympian formalism which he associated with Hesiod. Where they saw only the 
liberation of the human person from God and the exaltation of the scientific worldview, Merton 
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saw in Aeschylus’ Prometheus a symbol of the unity of science and wisdom rather than the 
uncritical affirmation of science alone. Nevertheless, he was not simply advocating a 
romanticized “back to nature” rejection of the benefits of technology, in particular because 
“Wisdom without science is unable to penetrate the full sapiential meaning of the created and 
material cosmos” (Gandhi 4). 
 Like several of the “death of God” theologians, Merton saw the potential of literature to 
fund the religious imagination and speak to an audience that found theological language 
meaningless. Since no formula or dogma could suffice to prosaically elaborate the deep meaning 
of the human condition, Merton suggested that “sapiential thought resorts to poetic myth and to 
religious or archetypal symbol” (Literary Essays 100) to provide not merely an intellectual 
understanding and control of external objects so much as a deepening understanding of self. 
Because of its capacity to evoke this awareness of the human’s true place in the universe, he saw 
literature as a privileged arena for the elucidation of wisdom in the modern world, even more 
than much philosophy and theology which, insofar as they attempted to “prose” the world, closed 
down rather than opened up this elusive, experiential, “sapiential” vision of the world. Merton 
took issue with those thinkers who straightforwardly identified “religious” literature with explicit 
faith, orthodoxy, having God “in the cast of characters” (Literary Essays 94) and other matters 
pertaining to organized religion. He instead turned to the Greek myths to illustrate that a story 
need not presuppose the existence of the gods, let alone devotion to their service, to be 
fundamentally religious in character. He noted that the reader could respond to Greek tragedy 
“without being converted to a belief in Zeus. As a matter of fact, Greek tragedy could imply a 
very definite ambiguity toward the gods…Aeschylus was not at all convinced that Zeus’ rule was 
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beneficial or even fully justified. And the Zeus of Prometheus is regarded as a usurper against 
whom Prometheus has a very plausible case” (Literary Essays 95). 
 What made literature of this character religious was specifically its capacity to evoke an 
enactment of the conflict which he believed is at the heart of the human predicament: the 
question not of “a coherent intellectual view of life but a creative effort to penetrate the meaning 
of man’s suffering and aspirations in symbols that are imaginatively authentic” (Literary Essays 
115). Following Aristotle’s theory of tragedy provoking a “catharsis of pity and terror,” Merton 
argued that tragic literature promotes liberation of self “by a return to a more real evaluation of 
ourselves, a change of heart analogous to Christian ‘repentance’” (Literary Essays 96) which, 
although distinct from theological “faith” springs from the same roots in its assertion of the 
meaningfulness of human experience. This self-evaluation was “something much more dynamic 
and modern than the classical hierarchical pyramid with God at the top, man halfway down, and 
prime matter at the bottom - an order in which each one has a fixed place determined for him 
eternally before he was born. In such a context, the call to repent is simply a call to assume one’s 
proper place in the cosmic order,” (Life and Living 126) which inevitably entails heteronomy and 
submission. This abstraction of a divine hierarchy to which “puny humanity” must submit gave 
way for Merton to something more akin to deconstruction of both the external divine ego and the 
grasping human ego. “Salvation” came to take on a radical new form for Merton, not the reward 
of the individual soul after death, but the attainment of freedom through a sapiential inhabiting of 
a more realistic vision of the place of the human in the cosmos: small but not irrelevant, 
intelligent but not all-knowing, technologically powerful but hardly the masters of our own fates. 
 Wisdom/sapientia and tragedy tellingly came together in Merton’s broader sense of the 
destiny of the human person. Merton invoked Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, noting, “The true 
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spiritual life is a life neither of dionysian orgy nor or apollonian clarity: it transcends both. It is a 
life of wisdom, a life of sophianic love” (New Seeds 141). Notably, Nietzsche saw Aeschylus’ 
Prometheus as the highest representation of tragedy, the synthesis of the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian that brings the spectator into the tension of boundedness and freedom that he saw 
defining the sapiential/sophianic religious perspective. That Merton indirectly linked tragedy and 
wisdom as the key to spiritual life signifies how much the decentering of the false self assumed a 
soteriological place in Merton’s thought.  
 This tragic soteriology, or perhaps tragedy AS soteriology, was not simply the discharge 
of pity and terror to “get it out of our systems” or leave it in the theater, scapegoat-like (in line 
with tragedy as tragoidia, “goat-song”) but mourning one’s way to a broader sense of self, 
rooted in the cosmos. Merton’s sense of “the religious” had evolved dramatically from his early 
idealization of the Catholic Church, and the monastic life in particular, coming to understand 
religion as framed not in opposition to secular life, but as a particular way of living one’s 
ordinary life. This mode of transformed religiosity involved not producing not peak moments of 
heightened religious “experience,” but a more stable “transformation of lost objects of belief into 
a more internalized and diffuse sense of the divine” (Jones 114), leaving a modality of religion 
which is “an alternative to the skeptical rejection of religion, or naive superstition, or a lifeless 
abstraction” (Jones 115). Such a mature religiosity destabilized the narcissistic search for 
certitude in any form, including ecclesial authority, the invocation of the “will of God,” one’s 
own conscience, and reason. This alternative “religion” was, for Merton, explicitly oriented to 
transformation of consciousness; rather than shoring up the narcissistic ego through the myriad 
productions of cultural and religious life, he came to imagine a tragic form of religion “which is 
born in us from God and which perhaps ought not to be called religion, born from the devastation 
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of our trivial ‘self’ and all our plans for ‘our self,’ even though they be plans for a holy self, a 
pure self, a loving, sacrificial self” (Conjectures 154). This model of religion, which looked so 
different from conventional religion as to merit another name, was rooted in moving away from 
identification with the small view of self in favor of a more realistic appropriation of one’s place 
in the world,. This de-idealization of religion involved a process of moving from immature 
narcissism toward what Heinz Kohut calls “cosmic narcissism,” facing the human condition with 
neither illusion nor resignation but empathic identification with the world construed as a larger 
self. 
 Merton’s resolution was no more atheism than it was “a-self-ism,” but a reconfiguration 
of both self and God, seeing through the “provisional self-construction which exists, for practical 
purposes, only in a sphere of relativity” (Zen 24). This “seeing through” of the falsities of the 
external self recentered the self, not on the individual subjectivity, but on God; however, this 
recentering “does not consider God either as Immanent or as Transcendent but as grace and 
presence, hence neither as a ‘Center’ imagined somewhere ‘out there’ nor ‘within ourselves’” 
(Merton, Zen 25). Metaphors of God as immanent and as transcendent continued to reify 
certitude either in God as Big Other or as enthroned in human reason, making alienated use of 
reason or faith the true lure on both sides of the same coin. 
 I suggest that Merton’s primary response to the problem of God in relationship to human 
freedom that occasioned his use of the symbol of Prometheus was his deconstruction, one might 
even say feminization, of the hypermasculinity of the self and God seen as self-contained 
subjects to be understood by contrast with others seen as objects. In “Two Faces of Prometheus” 
Merton highlighted competing visions of the feminine in Hesiod and Aeschylus’ myths, 
suggesting that he saw femininity, or more properly the hypermasculinity of Zeus, as the key to 
46 
 
 
understanding the opposed worldviews they presented. He noted the misogynistic and more 
broadly misanthropic tenor of Hesiod’s story, noting that Zeus was the destroyer of the older 
matriarchal system of divinity, the “subversive and dethroned gods of archaic Greece…, the 
society of the Earth mother, of Demeter, of Hera and Athene”; discussing Zeus’ “gift” of 
Pandora in the wake of Prometheus’ theft of fire, he commented, “Strange, ponderous fantasy of 
an aggressively male society! Woman comes from Zeus as a punishment, for in her ‘everything 
is good but her heart.’ Woman, the culminating penance in a life of labor and sorrow!” (Raids 
80). Zeus, the antithesis of matriarchy and maternal power, instituted an order of absolute control 
“in which no bird may chirp and no flower may look at the sun without the permission of the 
jealous Father” (Raids 80). Of the more generally oppressive view of the relationship between 
the gods and humanity, he added, “In the world picture of Hesiod, though it is beautiful, 
primitive, full of Hellenic clarity, we find this darkness, this oppressive and guilty view that life 
and love are somehow a punishment” (Raids 81). 
 Aeschylus’ tragedy, on the other hand, presented Zeus rather than Prometheus as the 
usurper who rose “between Prometheus and the Earth Mother and Ocean” (Raids 81); Merton 
highlighted again the promise of final victory: Prometheus “calls upon the feminine, the 
wordless, the timelessly moving elements to witness to his sufferings. Earth hears him” 
(Behavior of Titans 14). For Hesiod, Pandora as symbol of the feminine denoted that with which 
humanity was punished, the irascibility of the gods and the impossibility of basic trust in the 
world governed by the gods. For Aeschylus, however, the feminine became the locus of 
salvation, the witness to trust that Prometheus sought and failed to find in Zeus. The promise of 
Prometheus’ eventual freedom brought with it “the victory of Earth, that is to say of mercy, of 
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humanity, of innocence, of trust” (Behavior of Titans 14) which Merton explicitly connected 
with the feminine. 
 Merton moved from these pre-Socratic frames of reference to an explicitly Scriptural and 
Christian context in his response to the atomizing and “sovereign” Christian conception of God 
through the Biblical figured of Sophia. In a 1958 letter to Boris Pasternak, Merton recounted a 
dream of meeting a young Jewish girl named Proverb and retold his “Fourth and Walnut” 
experience which happened only a few days after that dream: “I was walking alone in the 
crowded street and suddenly saw that everybody was Proverb and that in all of them shone her 
extraordinary beauty and purity and shyness, even though they did not know who they 
were…And they did not know their real identity as the Child so dear to God who, from before 
the beginning, was playing in His sight all days, playing in the world” (I Have Seen 56-7). That 
Merton saw all people as Proverb, an allusion to the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament 
and the Biblical image of Sophia (Wisdom) playing before God (Proverbs 8: 30-31) suggest the 
relationship of Sophia to God and to his theological anthropology: God as simplicity and “no-
thing-ness” is the truest reality of the person for Merton, and just as people create narcissistic 
“false selves,” so has humanity created a “false self” for God, rooted in power fantasies and the 
reversal of everything that humanity cannot abide in itself. 
 In 1963 Merton published in limited edition a prose poem entitled “Hagia Sophia,” 
presenting his vision of Sophia, a metaphorically rich and complex meditation on God imagined 
in a feminine key, characterized by subtlety and hiddenness rather than muscular control. 
Highlighting the simplicity and humility of the God he labored to imagine, he wrote, “Hagia 
Sophia in all things is the Divine Life reflected in them, considered as a spontaneous 
participation, as their invitation to the Wedding Feast..The feminine principle in the world is the 
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inexhaustible source of creative realizations of the Father’s glory…But she remains unseen, 
glimpsed only by a few. Sometimes there are none who know her at all” (Spiritual Master 262). 
Merton’s focus on the opposed views of masculinity and femininity in the two Prometheus 
myths, as well as his writings on Sophia as a counterweight to hypermasculine God-talk, together 
suggest that Merton’s solution to the problem of God that drove so much of his early focus on 
the promethean character of theology is his re-imagination of God away from the abstraction of 
much Christian orthodoxy. In view of this vulnerable, simple, humble Sophia as the deepest 
reality of the person, the “small god” of Merton’s early essays became clearer: the god of power, 
self-exaltation, and authority over human freedom gave way to the God who enacted freedom 
from the external self as much as from tyrannical images of deity. He went so far as to argue 
straightforwardly that “The center of Christian humanism is the idea that God is love, not infinite 
power” (Love and Living 134). This was not simply the evacuation of power, so that God, or 
Christ, or Prometheus was to be understood as powerless tout court. For all of Merton’s early 
discussion of the “weak gods” who hoard the freedom that humanity covets, the Living God, 
Sophia, represented strength in an ironic key of weakness: “Through her wise answer, through 
her obedient understanding, through the sweet yielding consent of Sophia, God enters without 
publicity into the city of rapacious men. She crowns Him not with what is glorious, but with 
what is greater than glory: the one thing greater than glory is weakness, nothingness, poverty” 
(Spiritual Master 263). It may be argued that Merton reified gender stereotypes by writing 
“rapacity” into masculinity and “weakness, nothingness, poverty” into femininity, but his attempt 
to rethink divine power away from sovereignty and towards power as patience, as presence, as 
witness, stands within the lineage of later and more nuanced feminist and postcolonial 
theologies. “Hagia Sophia” concluded with an image of a God was henceforth to be found, not 
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above human fallibility, but there and only there: “A vagrant, a destitute wanderer with dusty 
feet, finds his way down a new road. A homeless God, lost in the night, without papers, without 
identification, without even a number, a frail expendable exile lies down in desolation under the 
sweet stars of the world and entrusts Himself to sleep” (Spiritual Master 264). Such a reversal of 
imagination of God as destitute, homeless, expendable entails not only seeing God as hospitable 
(i.e., in the dominant position in a power hierarchy), but as asking for hospitality. Caputo notes 
Derrida’s similar conception of hospitality “as an example of unconditionality without 
sovereignty, where he means the appeal made by the wayfarer, the stranger, the immigrant, e.g. – 
who has not the wherewithal to lay down his head, who lacks the power to defend him or herself, 
whose only defense is defenselessness, the power of powerlessness, the appeal to the good” 
(“Without Sovereignty” 17). 
 While Merton never fully absorbed the subtleties of feminist thought, and his work 
predated the rise of feminist theological scholarship as a significant movement in the academy, 
his use of the image of Sophia anticipated the later scholarship of feminist thinkers including 
Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Elizabeth Johnson, and Melissa 
Raphael.
11
 On its own, Merton’s sophianic theology offered a significant challenge and 
corrective to Christian worldviews built on the metaphor of divine omnipotence, and a number of 
Merton scholars have concluded studies of Merton’s Christology there, replacing the God of 
heteronomy and the “great Greek” Christ with the embodiment of mercy and simplicity in the 
                                                 
11 See Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology 
(New York: Continuum, 1994), Rosemary Radford Ruether, Goddesses and the Divine Feminine: A Western 
Religious History (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), and Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The 
Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992). Writing from the Jewish tradition, 
Melissa Raphael uses the symbol of Shekinah in similar ways to Christian uses of Sophia in The Female Face of God 
in Auschwitz: A Jewish Feminist Theology of the Holocaust (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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figure of Sophia.
12
 In the wake of the Holocaust, numerous Jewish (and to a much lesser extent, 
Christian) theologies have taken problematic Biblical and theological images with more 
seriousness, challenging a tendency to imagine God in philosophical terms that elide distasteful 
Biblical images. This “theodic crisis” opened reflection on an alternative Prometheanism that 
legitimately opposed a truly evil God, what Zachary Braiterman calls “antitheism,” refusing to 
justify evil and investigating the violent and even abusive character of God in the Biblical 
tradition (Auschwitz 4). As Melissa Raphael notes, those antitheodicies typically upbraid God for 
not being masculine enough, for not flexing the divine muscles against Israel’s enemies. These 
theologies stand by divine omnipotence at the expense of divine benevolence, but they do allow 
for contestation with God (e.g. GN 18: 16-33, GN 32) in a way that a static, all-perfect 
philosophical God-image does not. Against the dual heteronomies of submission or resistance to 
God, Merton and Raphael (and other feminist thinkers more generally) imagine God from a 
perspective that rejects divine omnipotence for the sake of divine solidarity, mercy as presence 
rather than as vengeance against one’s enemies. Thus, where typical images of Promethean 
revolt against the gods suggest the range of antitheodicies that Braiterman catalogues, Merton’s 
God joins the struggle against those “orthodox” but false gods which have taken the kingdom of 
God by force. 
 Nevertheless, Sophia did not render Prometheus irrelevant in Merton’s symbolic 
landscape so much as complement God-talk which might otherwise be mistaken as classical 
theism. I suggest that Merton’s late references to Aeschylus’ Prometheus as a solitary and a 
rebel, one who suffers for the sake of standing for justice, provide a corrective to 
disproportionately “passive” readings of his sophianic meditations. While it is certainly a highly 
                                                 
12 Note, for example, George Kilcourse, Ace of Freedoms: Thomas Merton’s Christ and Chris Pramuk, Sophia: The 
Hidden Christ of Thomas Merton, both of whom highlight kenosis as a centerpiece of Merton’s Christology. 
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significant goal to counter the excesses of Christendom, to “de-imperialize” the Christ of much 
Christian worship and belief, an overemphasis on kenosis, on gentleness, on yielding risked 
losing the critique that Merton saw as so important in the face of the destructive trajectories at 
work in the world. The confrontation was not with God, but with the powers and principalities, 
the “Zeuses,” not of the heavens, but of the earth, that Merton saw as so central to making the 
Titan’s rebellion intelligible and necessary. He clearly did not see quietism, gentleness, yielding 
as the final goal in the formation of the self: his challenge to the Cartesian ego was in the service 
of retrieving the fearless, unselfconscious freedom of heart that enabled the solitary to stand 
apart from the conventions of common opinion and mass atrocity. 
It is at this level of prophetic challenge that it becomes clear that Merton’s tragic view of 
salvation via sapientia was not a merely interior or solipsistic one. If his theology simply 
replaced a powerful God with a powerless one and preached sentimentality instead of 
abstraction, it would lose any hope of calling on Prometheus as an icon of political resistance. In 
his later years Merton wrote furiously about the social issues of his day, from racism and the 
Vietnam War to the madness of nuclear proliferation, challenging the abstracting worldview that 
made such atrocities possible. Even as he was troubled by some of the more extreme actions of 
his friends in the peace movement, such as burning draft cards (or bodies)
13
 and pouring blood 
on nuclear nose cones, his more serious concern was with the apparent ease with which people 
ceded their freedom (and their consciences) to collective power, supporting warmongering with 
their silences and their vocal approval. To that end, he noted, “The true rebellion against God 
today is not merely that of the defiant and promethean individual, but much rather that of the 
                                                 
13 Merton was horrified by the 1965 self-immolation of Catholic Worker Roger LaPorte, leading him to temporarily 
withdraw his support from the Catholic Peace Fellowship out of concern that the peace movement itself was 
driven by a moral void, itself as violent as the violence that it claimed to oppose. 
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massive and abstract collectivity in which man in the neuter, das Mann, [sic] man in the 
anonymous mass, becomes serenely convinced of his inviolable security as master of his own 
destiny and of his world” (Merton, Mystics 275). He pointed to Adolf Eichmann as a peculiarly 
extreme example of “mass man,” the individual who had so handed over his moral compass to 
the collective that there was nothing left of personal responsibility to challenge injustice. 
Merton’s “Devout Meditation in Honor of Adolf Eichmann” examined Hannah Arendt’s book on 
Eichmann’s trial, in particular focusing on the horror of Eichmann having been found sane by the 
court psychiatrist: “The ‘sanity’ of modern man is about as useful to him as the huge bulk and 
muscles of the dinosaur. If he were a little less sane, a little more doubtful, a little more aware of 
his absurdities and contradictions, perhaps there might be a possibility of his survival” (Raids 
49). 
Against the mass mind as represented by Eichmann, Merton poised the solitary, like the 
lonely Titan on Caucasus, standing as an eternal NO to the tyranny of the mass mind. Against the 
institutionalized formalism he experienced in the monastery, he interpreted the eremitic life he 
was living by the mid-1960s as as “a sort of guerrilla-outpost” that he claimed enabled him to be 
more honest and authentic in his critique (both of the world and of the monastery) than he would 
be if he lived outside of the discipline that the monastic life afforded him. In the preface to the 
Japanese edition of The Seven Storey Mountain, Merton wrote, “By my monastic vows and life, I 
am saying NO to all the concentration camps, the aerial bombardments, the staged political trials, 
the judicial murders, the racial injustices, the economic tyrannies, and the whole socio-economic 
apparatus which seems geared for nothing but global destruction in spite of all its fair words in 
favor of peace” (Honorable Reader 65). While he no longer understood the monastic vocation as 
inherently or automatically a mode of resistance to power (since he came to see how much the 
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monastic life could recreate its own distinctive false selves and false gods), he hoped that by 
deliberately standing apart from the secular world and, as a hermit, from the monastic 
production, he might create a liminal space from which to take a valuable perspective on the 
affairs of his time. 
While dissent became increasingly important for Merton as a monk and a Christian, he 
knew firsthand the effects of that dissent: crucifixion, whether on Caucasus or Calvary, inflicted 
not by the living God (who was the very one being crucified) but by Caesar and all who prefer 
the small gods, theological or otherwise. Merton’s late Prometheus, like Christ a true rebel, 
rebels against victimization in all its forms and thus always becomes another victim, not 
powerless but vulnerable, without sovereignty, the unenviable but inevitable reality of the human 
situation. Evacuating the image of God as guarantor of divine order in favor of a God who is the 
fly in the ointment, found (only) in the risky, uncertain and lonely voice of dissent, Merton 
antedated Milbank and Žižek by decades in affirming the “monstrosity” of Christ and all who 
dissent: drawing on the absurdist play Rhinoceros by Eugene Ionesco, he noted, “To be the last 
man in the rhinoceros herd is, in fact, to be a monster” (Raids 20). Merton’s Christ and his 
Prometheus thus blended, not simply in Sophianic hiddenness and shyness, but in the 
consequences of standing against the destructiveness of the herd, the abstracting and de-
individualizing worldview of Zeus. “There will always be a place, says Ionesco, ‘for those 
isolated consciences who have stood up for the universal conscience’ as against the mass mind. 
But their place is solitude. They have no other. Hence it is the solitary person (whether in the city 
or in the desert) who does mankind the inestimable favor of reminding it of its true capacity for 
maturity, liberty, and peace” (Raids 22). The Promethean solitude of Merton in his hermitage 
and Christ on the Cross became not turning away from the world and turning to God, as if the 
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two were opposed, but the very principle of “yes-saying” to life, an affirmation of the tragic 
character of existence and of God as the very force of resistance to that which does the 
crucifying by freezing life in any system of abstraction, whether religious or irreligious. 
Merton’s protestations that the Christian God is not Zeus, that the struggles and 
sufferings of Prometheus against God are not only unnecessary but entirely self-imposed, 
demonstrate the degree to which his theology remained highly iconic, monastic, and mythic 
rather than scriptural or, to a lesser degree, even liturgical. Merton might well have agreed with 
Joseph McLelland’s attempts to defuse the tension of “Prometheus or God” by making the “will 
of God” simply equivalent to what upholds the wellbeing of humanity. McLelland argued, “The 
God of Israel is known as a covenanting deity whose will is so selfless that even his 
Commandments take the form not of heteronomous or arbitrary dictates but of guidance for the 
Way of authentic humanity” (Prometheus Rebound 39). Apart from missing the point that 
commandments need not be arbitrary to be heteronomous, however, McLelland seriously 
underestimated the problem of Biblical texts that certainly seem to present God as cruel, 
arbitrary, or heteronomous, the number of which is simply too high to be waved aside. 
Merton began his “Two Faces of Prometheus” with a story told by Erasmus and Colet 
about the “first sin” of Cain, not the murder of Abel but the theft of seeds of corn from Paradise, 
from which humanity had of course been exiled: “He planted them and succeeded admirably as a 
farmer, but this drew down upon him the wrath of the Almighty. His sacrifices were no longer 
acceptable” (Raids 11). Merton’s only comment on this story was to note the humanist impulse 
behind it: “It is curiously significant that modern and ‘progressive’ man should consider himself 
somehow called upon to vindicate Cain, and that in doing so he should identify Cain with the 
fire-bearing Titan whom he has been pleased to make the symbol of his own technological 
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genius and of his cosmic aspirations” (Raids 11). In view of Cain’s punishment for resisting 
God’s monarchical imposition of exile from the Garden, who would NOT vindicate Cain? From 
the binding of Isaac (GN 22) to the death of the Egyptian firstborn to the xenophobic, 
heteronormative and misogynistic utterances and actions ascribed to God in both Old and New 
Testaments, the philosophical abstraction of God as all-good coming into contact with the 
irascible God of the Bible too easily leads to the nihilistic mental gymnastics of rationalizing 
texts that are genuinely terrible.
14
 More critically, however, even a benevolent dictator remains a 
dictator, and seeing divine commandments, “God’s will,” as uniformly the path to “authentic 
humanity” risks closing off conversation: if God is issuing commands, they must be for the good 
of humanity, so again, conversation, the “democracy to come,” becomes antithetical to human 
flourishing. 
  
                                                 
14 See, as one investigation among many into problematic Biblical portrayals of God, Phyllis Trible’s classic Texts of 
Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984. 
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Conclusion: Prometheus De-Livered 
 
Merton’s early essays on Prometheus challenged what he saw as a “death-mysticism” of 
self-loathing which made God a problem for humanity. This Prometheus, admirable for his 
willingness to face the terror of “having to be himself, having to be a person” (New Man 24) and 
pitiable in his sufferings, was finally mistaken for chaining himself to the rock of guilt for 
defying the small gods he himself created and despised. Merton’s response was an effort to free 
religious people from unnecessary suffering at the hands of illusory gods who opposed human 
freedom and flourishing, in favor of a God who already in his theology did not occupy the 
judge’s bench. As his theology and his contact with the world outside the monastery matured, he 
came to see that dispelling those small (theological) gods did not spell the end of the Titan’s 
torment. Camus’ “Prometheus in Hell” named the antihumanist risk of both antitheism and 
political rebellion: “Prometheus alone has become god and reigns over the solitude of men. But 
from Zeus he has gained only solitude, and cruelty; he is no longer Prometheus, he is Caesar. 
The real, the eternal Prometheus has now assumed the aspect of one of his victims” (McLelland, 
Prometheus Rebound, 235). “Render unto God what is God’s” might no longer point to a God 
who was simply a bigger and stronger version of Caesar, but Merton saw that Caesar remained 
alive and well in the modern era, and rebellion against him carried its own dangers, both from 
within and without. Where Camus argued that, “we have but one way of creating God which is 
to become him” (Literary Essays 221), Merton challenged such illusory exaltation of humanity 
with what Camus already knew, namely that “since man has decided to occupy the place of God 
he has shown himself to be by far the blindest, and cruelest, and pettiest and most ridiculous of 
all the false gods” (Raids 61). That is, the (false) heteronomous God that modernity rejected as a 
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threat to human freedom too often became a template for the exalted/alienated humanity that 
now needed to fill the void of omnipotence and control. 
Merton’s response to the modern impulse to take the place of gods was, paradoxically, 
the retrieval of humility, not bowing and scraping before a more powerful force or hating 
humanity for its weakness or ignorance, but love of the human condition, a call to “be human in 
this most inhuman of ages, to guard the image of man for it is the image of God” (Raids 6). 
Merton believed that it was in acceptance of the naked and vulnerable self that humanity 
becomes most human by refusing to run from the fearful and shaming parts of life. His rejection 
of classical theism paradoxically functioned as a “yes” to the human condition: where classical 
theism exalted God through attributing to God descriptors which were the opposite of human 
limitedness, fallibility, and weakness, Merton’s Sophia was an affirmation of the existential 
depths of the human condition, exemplified in the most marginal and “irrelevant” of persons. 
Naturally, this insight drew strongly on the kenotic images of Christ in the New Testament, but it 
sought to heal the odd rift between the weakness of Christ and the omnipotence of God which 
has endured in Christian theology for centuries. This meant that kenosis, self-emptying, was not 
in Merton’s system about God “condescending” or lowering Godself from on high into the muck 
of the human situation, which would simply reinstate the bifurcation of a genuinely omnipotent 
deity merely play-acting or trying on humility for a while before returning to God’s rightful 
sovereignty. Rather, if for Christians Christ is the “image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15), then 
for Merton the utter vulnerability of Christ indicated something about the character of the 
Christian God which is quite distinct from the power fantasies which remain at the backbone of 
much Christian liturgy and theology. Writing from a Continental philosophical perspective, J. 
Aaron Simmons notes the political import of such theological imagery: “kenosis contests the 
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idea of the detached, isolated modern subject. If God is not primarily conceived of as a self-
enclosed, absolutely immutable being standing over and against the world, and as best defined in 
terms of power, but as an originally outpouring of love toward the world, then it follows that, as 
imago Dei, the self is plausibly understood as also originally poured-out to others” (God and the 
Other 168). Where “becoming God” in Camus’s system would entail flight from the 
vulnerability of humanity into the sovereignty of divinity, Merton reversed that pattern by having 
the suffering and failing Christ become not only the pattern of authentic humanity but that of 
divinity as well, rather than its antithesis: growth in humanity, in tragic acceptance of the human 
condition, became the mode of divinization. Insofar as exaltation of the infinite God as defined 
in opposition to the human condition denigrated the finite, love of God could only diminish 
humanity; in response, Merton recognized God precisely in facing the existential abyss of 
humanity’s contingency and absurdity, saw love of the human condition as the key to loving 
God. This was no trump card to “prove” the superiority of Christian dogma or make the 
Incarnation into a magical cure-all; on the contrary, since Merton saw so much ecclesial 
duplicity in claiming a crucified God but enacting the power fantasy of divine heteronomy. This 
was, against Christian orthodoxy, an effort to take kenosis seriously, not as “play-acting” with 
weakness, but the model of authentic entrance into the contingency of the human condition. The 
family resemblance with radical theology is significant; as Simmons puts it, “Since the God that 
Nietzsche rightly declared ‘dead’ is the metaphysical God, Vattimo contends that the God of the 
Book is a God best understood as kenotic. As incarnated, emptied, historical, and human, the 
kenotic God is not representative of classical theistic claims to God’s omnipotence, but instead 
exemplifies what John Caputo (2006) refers to as ‘the weakness of God’” (God and the Other 
174). 
59 
 
 
Given the pains which Merton took to distance his God-talk from a classical theistic 
vocabulary, it remains worthwhile to ask if Merton so evacuated any content from God as to 
render his particular kind of “a-theism” indistinguishable from atheism. Just as his rejection of a 
Cartesian definition of the self manifested in a theological anthropology that was strongly 
marked by unsaying and negation, similarly his God-talk was heavily driven by “unsaying” 
much of what had come to be taken for granted in the Christian tradition. That is, the 
anthropological tendency to construct “false selves” against the nakedness of the human 
condition paralleled a theological trajectory of constructing a God-image out of the negation of 
human fallibility. While he certainly favored an apophatic vocabulary in his late writings on 
God, he grew past the temptation of the apophatic tradition to simply “lodge God more deeply 
still in the onto-theological circuit that circles between being and beings” (Weakness 10). Despite 
his disagreement with their social ethics, Merton was in fundamental agreement with the “death 
of God” theologians who saw the impossibility of imagining God in the same way as a medieval 
person might, as the topmost point of a great chain of being. This God issued no commands, 
stopped no atrocities, judged no sinners. Despite his invocation of God to the end, was Merton 
left with functional atheism? Robert Inchausti noted that Merton’s struggle to speak of God in a 
non-objectifying way indicates the limitation of language as it applies to the apophatic tradition: 
“Merton would agree with those atheists who deny God’s existence as some sort of super 
‘decider,’ concept, or ‘thing,’ but he would disagree with those who then draw the conclusion 
that God, therefore, does not exist. What does not exist is the Cartesian God-object. What does 
exist is a presence revealed in and through the love that rises in us out of a ground that lies 
beyond us” (Apologies 7). 
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Merton’s “weak” theology, lacking the “super-decider” who would impose some final 
decision from above, gave new impetus to human action, not in a simple utilitarianism that 
justified any means for the sake of the end of implementing a utopian project, but in what radical 
theology might call a “democracy to come.” He eschewed the temptation to turn critique into an 
alternative program or reconfiguration, recognizing the revolutionary trajectory of replacing an 
old tyranny with a new one: “our task is to dissociate ourselves from all who have theories which 
promise clearcut and infallible solutions, and to mistrust all such theories, not in a spirit of 
negativism and defeat, but rather trusting life itself, and nature, and if you will permit me, God 
above all” (Raids 61). This trust of life itself suggests the redemption of the capacity for sane and 
simple acceptance of smallness while honoring the particular, the local, the individual rather than 
“looking through the wrong end of the telescope” and turning smallness into nothingness. 
Just as Aeschylus’ Prometheus knew that his eventual victory over the tyranny of Zeus 
would be one of patience and wisdom rather than force, Merton knew that, as a monk and poet, 
his only tools for advancing peace were his words, and that the ability to hold together opposites 
in conversation (conversatio) was the hallmark of monastic conversion (conversatio) in the post-
Christian era. His later works included titles like “Letters to a White Liberal,” A Vow of 
Conversation and Cables to the Ace, suggesting communication and dialogue, and while his 
writings did not typically include “conversation” with God, this was not because God was a 
conversation stopper, but because God as “other” had given way to God as the deepest reality of 
the self. In his “Letter to Pablo Antonio Cuadra Concerning Giants,” Merton wrote, “Christ is 
found not in loud and pompous declarations but in humble and fraternal dialogue. He is found 
less in a truth that is imposed than in a truth that is shared” (Collected Poems 383). I suggest that 
Merton saw this non-sovereign Christ authorizing (in a non-authoritarian way) the possibility of 
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dialogue, the recognition that power-over is not the only kind of power, and the respect for the 
individual experience that might sanction democracy, a “democracy-to-come” that need not, 
could not, threaten disagreement with condemnation. Thus, without claiming that he accepted the 
“death of God” theology without reservations, I suspect that Merton would feel much more at 
home with radical theology or theopoetics, understood as the inheritor of the concerns of the 
death of God theologies of his time, than with most academic and ecclesial theology which was 
rooted in divine sovereignty, and which more generally attempted a prosaic explication of the 
fundamentally poetic character of religion and of life. This played out in Merton’s theology, not 
as atheism understood as disbelief in the existence of any God, but as a kind of “a-theism,” a 
refusal of classical theism as the production of a reified God-object imagined at the top of the 
pyramid of being and power and endorsing the sovereignty of non-democratic exercise of power. 
In place of that God-object was left something not unlike Caputo’s “weak force” of 
deconstruction, a non-dualistic, non-hierarchical “spark” at the center of the self, deconstructing 
both God and self. 
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